A carriage plummets from a viaduct into a river, another train lays on its side on the bridge above.
Why were they both on the same piece of track at the same time? What mistakes led to this wreckage and claimed the lives of 10.
Once again, I would like to start by thanking you all for tuning in and listening to me rattle on about the darkest days of rail. We’re four episodes in now and I’m happy to have not scared you all off yet.
Once again I appeal to you all if you want to support the podcast and the work I’m doing, please share this with anybody you think might want to listen in, learn a little bit about these incidents and how the safety culture of the railways has been hard earned over many years.
There’s some interesting stuff going off in the world of railway safety at the moment, with the RAIB having released a report and safety digest within the the last month, as well as the ongoing investigation into the derailment at Stonehaven. In addition the branch is also investigating the derailment and subsequent fire on a tanker train at, and I am making a very weak attempt at pronouncing this, llangennoch in Wales which took place 2 weeks later.
With that out of the way, it’s time for us to move into episode four.
Prelude
The bustling industrial metropolis of Manchester was just waking up, residents of the city starting their walk to work in the mills or the offices of the city. Those walking in from the east started to slow and gather when they reached the river, looking to the viaduct 40 feet up they saw the wreckage and damaged masonry. As their eyes followed down, they saw a fallen carriage lying with one end in the river below. The year? 1951. The place? Irk Valley Junction.
Opening Credits
This is Signals to Danger, A podcast where we look at major rail disasters which have occurred in the UK, explain what happened, how the investigation was carried out, and how each of these accidents shaped the industry going forwards.
I’m Dan, I’m work within the rail industry in my day to day life but today I’ll be the one taking you through this podcast.
As I have done each episode, allow me to put some context on the era this accident occured.
Opening Credits
This is Signals to Danger, A podcast where we look at major rail disasters which have occurred in the UK, explain what happened, how the investigation was carried out, and how each of these accidents shaped the industry going forwards.
I’m Dan, I’m work within the rail industry in my day to day life but today I’ll be the one taking you through this podcast.
We’ve gone back in time a little further from our previous episodes now, so to put some context on the time, the year is 1953.
The 31st of January had seen 1836 people across several contries and at sea killed by the North Sea Flood of, well, 1953.
The 5th of February sees the animated Disney adventure Peter Pan premier and the 1st March is when Joseph Stalin suffered a stroke that would render him unconcious till his death.
In fact the year is a very eventful one, with the first James Bond novel being published in April and by the time we reach the end of May, Sir Edmund Hillary and Tenzing Norgay become household names when they become the first people to summit Mount Everest.
In rail, it had only been several years since the transport act of 1947 had grouped all of the rail operators into one national provider, British Railways. By this point the new national operator, although short lived had already seen 18 notable incidents, but by far the most sigificant had occurred the year before. 1952 had seen one of the really big disasters to occur on the UK rail network, in fact the last to have a death toll in triple digits. In October 1952 the three train pile up at Harrow and Wealdstone had claimed the lives of 112 people, and injured a staggering 340.
And so this whistlestop tour brings us to the morning of Saturday the 15th August 1953.
Manchester has always been a city well served by the railway. At present the city centre is served by 4 mainline stations, Piccadilly, Victoria, Oxford Road and Deansgate. These stations were joined at one point by Manchester Central, now an exhibition centre and Mayfield, currently abandoned. In fact, between the years of 1830 and 1844 Manchester was also home to Liverpool road station, the Manchester terminus of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway. This was the worlds first inter-city passenger railway with a timetable of steam hauled passenger services.
After a short 14 years as a passenger station, the increasing amount meant that train services were eventually moved to Victoria station, which became a major station for workers who commuted into the city.
10 miles down the lines you could find the Lancashire town of Bury. Another mill town that had grown up during the industrial revolution, the town saw a regular service into the big city. The town doesn’t have a mainline rail station any more, but in the 50s services left from Bolton Street Station into Manchester. As a side note, most people nowadays will know Bolton Street as the home of the East Lancashire Railway, a heritage railway often abbreviate to the East Lancs.
The Bury line, as this was known, had been open since the 1850s, but in 1916 the line was electrified. This had happened far earlier than the previous lines we’ve discussed, and instead of overhead wires, it was decided that they would use a third rail system. This means that while the wheels of the train sat on the two running rails, an extra rail, the third rail, was run alongside the track and electical power was supplied to the train through it. A contact shoe on the train takes the power from the rail and supplies traction equipment on the train.
Unusually, and actually uniquely, the third rail system they use picks up power from the side of the rail and not the top, which was the case everywhere else this type of system was installed.
Because of this electrification, the 0720 train from Bury into Manchester was composed of what must have felt like a cleaner and more modern feeling type of train. The lancashire and yorkshire railway had started using electric multiple units in the liverpool area in 1906, and in 1916, they rolled them out on the Bury line as well. The five car units were built of an all metal construction, 220 tonnes of steel underframe and aluminium panelling. They had provided reliable commuter service into the city ever since they were introduced.
On this Saturday morning the electric train departed Bury at 0720, heading out on the relatively short 9 and 3 quarter mile journey into Manchester. With Motorman F. Hardman at the controls, the journey was uneventful, and the train was running to time by the time it reached its final call before Victoria, Woodlands Road.
For 20 seconds the train stood at Woodlands road, Motorman Harding pulling his window down and shouting a greeting to the porter at the station, Mr Knight. The porter recalled a smiling, well looking Mr Harding when he was asked later about the encounter.
After the prescribed time, the electric train departed woodlands Road and proceeded down the line towards Manchester, passing the signal box queens road junction at the correct speed for a clear run into the city. As the train rounded the next bend Collyhurst Viaduct number 2 came into view.
Collyhurst number 2 is quite a unique viaduct. While across the network there’s such a wide variety of bridges and viaducts, they can be straight or curved, very high or very low, what you normally find is that the same number of tracks normally enter a viaduct as leave it. Your standard mainline viaduct would probably have two tracks enter, cross the bridge and leave the other side.
What Collyhurst number two featured, was a junction. At the Manchester end (the UP end if you’ve been listening to previous episodes), two tracks entered the viaduct, UP being into the city and DOWN leading out. But these two tracks then split, two tracks continued on towards Bury, and two split off towards Newton Heath, and then further onto the foothills of the Pennines. This junction on the viaduct, high above the River Irk, was, unsurprisingly, Irk Valley Junction.
16 minutes after the electric train had been allowed to depart Bury, at 0736 a steam hauled passenger service had left Manchester Victoria, heading out to the town of Bacup to the north east of the city. Hauled by locomotive number 42474, a 2 cylinder steamer, originally built for the London Midland and Scottish railway, the four passenger carriages of the train slowly started up the incline out of the station, under the careful control of Driver F. Heap.
The 0736 entered Collyhurst Tunnel and crossed under the main lines toward Miles Platting. After it left the tunnel it steadily travelled the almost 400 yards to Irk Valley Junction, crossing Collyhurst Viaduct number 1 and eventually coming to a stand at a signal at the junction.
In order to Bacup, the 0736 needed to take the junction towards Newton Heath, which would take it across the Up Main and onto the second branch of the viaduct. After coming to a brief halt at the signal controling the junction from Manchester, the signal cleared and Driver Heap started to take his train across the junction.
As the locomotive was crossing the diamond over the Up main, the electric train rounded the corner and entered the viaduct. At around 35 miles an hour the leading carriage quickly reached the junction, where the first carriage of the steam train was now starting to cross diagonally the Up Main.
The front carriage of the the electric train smashed into the rear of the steam locomotive, deflecting both to their respective right hand sides. The steam locomotive, only travelling at around 5 to 6 mph, ended up tipped over on its right-hand side a few metres over the junction to the branch line. The first coach of the stteam train had had it’s leading corner crumpled and the damage continued down the side as the first vehicle of the electric train continued to scrape along it.
The leading coach of the electric was derailed to the right at an angle of around 45 degrees and came into contact with the parapet wall. At the point where it met the second coach of the steam service, it was further deflected to the right and smashed through the parapet. After hanging there for an agonising few seconds, the coupler between the first and second vehicles failed, and the leading carriage plummeted nose first, 40 feet down to the bank below. As the front of the carriage collided with the ground, the rear started to fall backwards, ending up in the river itself, a further 30 feet down.
The image of this carriage, lying on its side across the bank diagonally with the trailing end submerged in the river with the viaduct above is the defining one of this accident.
The second carriage of the electric ended up leaning against the parapet, adjacent to the 1st coach of the steam service. Unusually for accidents of this era, there is a uncharacteristically high definition photograph of the accident scene on the bridge, it’s out there on the website Flickr, and is actually part of a collection from Greater Manchester Police. I would say it’s worth having a look to appreciate the height and scale of this accident.
Luckily the impact with the 0736 had managed to bleed out most of the speed of the electric service, so in the end it was only the leading vehicle fell from the viaduct. This undoubtedly saved many lives, and prevented a horrific pile of carriages from forming, each falling and crushing the one before.
The crash was witnessed by a railway employee who raised the alarm, and all of the emergency services were within a matter of minutes. This would be one of the silver linings of the accident, it’s proximity to the city centre meant that both emergency services and hospitals were close to hand.
Although services on this morning were slightly quieter due to the fact it was a Saturday, the leading carriage of the electric train had been well filled and heavily damaged, so 10 people did lose their lives at Irk Valley Junction, these included the driver, Motorman Hardman as well as 9 passengers. A further 58 were injured and 22 of those were classed as seriously injured.
__Music Swell__
The railway must continue, so breakdown cranes were ordered by British Railways from depots at both Newton Heath in Manchester and Bank Hall in Liverpool. Rail replacement buses were set up, not just a luxury enjoyed by passengers now…
By around half past 5 in the morning of the 17th, less than two full days later, the line was cleared and normal working resumed.
__Music Swell__
Like all other accidents on the railway, this one needed to be fully investigated and understood, to better prevent it occurring again. Much like the Nuneaton report we discussed last time, this took the form of a ministerial report to the relevant minister. The report for Irk Valley, penned by a Colonel D McMullen, was released by the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation.
The colonel was tasked with achieving a full and thought understanding of the events of the 15th August. Something had clearly gone terribly wrong, and with junctions like this being a perfectly regular feature of the railway, it was crucial that reasons be found.
Gaining this understanding and ascertaining the reasons would revolve around an understanding of the following points;
- Firstly, what was the sequence of events which had led to two different trains on the same piece of track at the same time.
- Secondly, what protections had been in place to prevent such an accident taking place?
- And Finally, what had stopped safety measures from actually being effective.
The first point, the sequence of events was probably the most simple question to answer. Both services were timetabled trains, both running to time and operated on an almost daily basis. Under the timetable itself, the electric train was booked to cross Irk Valley junction at 07:40, one minute after the steam was booked to cross over at 07:39.
On the actual day, the electric train passed multiple signal boxes and under the rules, each of them had to enter into a log book what time trains passed, as well as what time messages were sent etc.
It was established that both trains had left their origin stations at the correct time, and while the steam train had only had a very short jounrey, it had passed the Newtown No1 box on schedule, and then reached Irk Valley at the right time. This was refelcted in the logs for both boxes, although the box records for Irk Valley were filled out after the accident took place.
The electric train had been on time throughout its journey and again this was reflected in the logs of each box.
The logs, in lieu of some of the technology in place today, allowed both investigators, and indeed us, to understand the details of the journies involved.
Nowadays, trains are fitted with their very own versions of the aviation industries black box. These are known under several names, On train data recorders, on train monitoring recorder, event recorders, but whatever the name, the principle is the same, the kit records data such as speed, control positions, whether the horn was used, so on and so forth. This has proved invaluable in many accidents, but unfortunately, while they were starting to develop early versions, there was nothing fitted to the trains at Irk Valley.
__Music Swell__
So, the general sequence of events was well recorded using the methods of the time, we know that both trains were about it the right place at the right time. The timetable itself had them both planned to occupy the junction with only a minute between them.
This close proximity of timings was nothing unusal on the railway, and busy junctions outside stations could see many moves very close together. This naturally introduces conflicts, so the railway obviously couldn’t just give everybody a copy of the timetable and leave them to it, nor could they just set points based on what was expected when.
This is the start of answering point two. What systems were in place to protect trains at Irk Valley and prevent accidents taking place?
The obvious answer is that people need to be in control of the organsised chaos of the railway, and these are the signallers, who communicate messages to trains using, well, signals.
To better understand how this protection works, it would be helpful to do a very brief introduction to signalling, and particularly the type of signalling at this time, absolute block.
The basis principle of signalling is simple and crucial in equal parts, one train, in one section of track, at one time. The safest way to prevent trains colliding is to make sure they’re clearly separated into different sections of track.
There are some very specific exceptions to the rule of one train per section, but they’re not really applicable to this incident, and they’re even more carefully controlled than normal signalling.
While you might be used to seeing colour light signalling on your travels now, in 1950s manchester, semaphore signals were the name of the game, horizontal boards were positioned in different ways depending on the signal displayed. If the signal is at danger, or ON, the board is horizontal. If it’s at a 45 degree angle then the signal is OFF and trains can proceed.
All of these signals were controlled by signallers, physically located in signal boxes close to the features they were responsible for, moving the signals using a complex system of levers, cables, metal bars and pulleys. Normally these boxes were located to cover either a specific junction, such as Irk Valley Junction Signal Box, a station, or a specific section of line.
The last thing its worth touching on is the specific type of signalling that was used here. Absolute Block. A method that was devised in the second half of the 19th century, it relies on the ability of each of these consecutive signal boxes to be able to communicate with each other. A vastly simplified description of how this works is this.
Each section of line has a signal box to control it, it also has a home signal and a starter signal. The Home signal denotes the end of this block, and the starter signal is the start of the next block. Both of these signals consist of a red board, and can show a danger, stop aspect, and a proceed aspect. In advance of these you can also have a distant signals which can show a caution or proceed. These are yellow with a notch in the end.
In any case, these signalling sections are each controlled by one signal box and in order for them to pass trains between them they need to communicate with each other.
A simple example is this, imagine you have 3 signal boxes for section A, B and C. Each has a distant signal, a home signal and a starter signal. For a train to leave section A that signaller must contact the signaller at block B to ask if the line is clear. If, and only if Signaller B replies saying yes, Signaller A can place his Home and Starter signals to proceed and tell the train it can proceed.
When the train passes Box A, that signaller tells box B the train is entering his section. Now at this point, the Home and Starter signals in section B are still at danger. If signaller B does nothing else, the train will first come to a distant signal at caution, warning him to stop, and then a home signal at danger which he will need to stop at. Very safe if we don’t know the line ahead is clear, but not very good for an efficient railway.
To allow the train to proceed, box B must contact box C to ask the same question as he was asked, is the line clear? When he receives the response yes, that is the point he can set his signals to proceed to allow the train to continue to the next section. And so on and so forth down the line.
Like I said, a very swift rundown of the system and as every time I do this, probably a gross over simplification. It’s probably worth mentioning that all of these messages between boxes is done as a series of bell codes, and use of block instruments which transmit information, but I don’t want to get too bogged down in it, I would say there are some great videos on youtube that explain it far better than I, including an LMS video entitled Sentinals of Safety, particularly prominent as the signalling at Irk Valley was equipment installed by LMS themselves.
The whole system relies on constant and clear communication to ensure trains are only allowed to enter a clear section. And on the morning in question this had taken place, each box from Bury to Irk Valley had been offered and excepted the electric train without any real incident. There was a sytem in place to protect the trains. This very much answers the 2nd question, was something in place to prevent this happeneing? Yes there was, and it should have allowed for every train to transit that junction safely that day.
If it was used correctly.
And that is the point where we hit question 3 – What stopped the safety measures from being effective. Protections in place at Irk Valley really were adequate by the standard of the day, and had been used successfully thousands of times, but upon investigating the incident colonel McMullen identified two places it had fallen down.
The first, and probably the most significant, but not by a large margin, was in a breach of the regulations surrounding block working. The Irk Valley box controlled three sets of signals. The Up Main towards Mancheser victoria and Down signals to both Queens Road box, which was towards Bury, and the Down towards Smedley Viaduct Box which leads off on the junction towards Newton Heath.
The signaller in control of the box was relief signaller A Clayton. He was responsible for safe and efficient transit of all services over the junction. Not permanently based at the box, he had taken over duties there
5 days before after learning the workings.
On the day in question, the electric train had been offered from the Woodlands Road signaller to the next box at Queens Road Junction. It had been accepted as the signals were clear.
Once he received the message, train entering section, the signaller at queens road, a Mr Davenport offered the train in turn to Irk Valley and signaller Clayton, who accepted it at 07 29 in the morning, 11 minutes before it was due through the junction, sending the message back to signaller Davenport that his line was clear.
Clayton was then offered the 0736 steam train at 0733, which he accepted, telling the preceding box that the line was clear. By the time the steam train had exited the tunnel from Victoria, Clayton had not yet received the message to tell him that the electric was entering his section. With this in mind he contacted signaller Davenport and enquired as to the location of the electric. Davenport told Clayton he would enquire from the preceeding box in turn.
It was at this point that Clayton made a fatal decision. Assuming that the electric had not yet passed the queens road box he decided that, to avoid delay to the steam train, he would get it moving. He reversed the junction, set the points over to the branch and cleared the Down Home Signal towards Smedley Viaduct. He went back to the telephone and then, just after the steam loco had passed his box he heard Davenport tell him that the electric had just passed the queens road box. Clayton could do nothing. The collision happened very shortly afterwards.
The Up Main Home signal was still at danger, and should theoretically have protected the junction, but a risk was intriduced by the fact that Clayton had broken a regulation meant to keep block working safer.
Regulation four meant that Clayton should never have allowed the steam to cross over the junction after telling Davenport his line was clear. This was a serious breach of the rules. He had told another signaller his line was clear, then took actions which meant that it wasn’t. This directly led to the accident taking place.
__Music Swell__
The other cause identified was just as serious. As I’ve just explained, the Irk Valley Up Home Signal which protected the junction from the direction the electric Train was headed was at Danger. The electric train should never have passed it.
In fact the distant signal just before was at caution, and should have prompted Motorman Hardman to slow his train in preparation to stop. He did not. In fact it would appear that no effort was made to slow his train at all prior to the collision.
I think it’s fairly safe to say this was a fairly serious breach in itself, and was realistically just as much to blame for the accident, but had Signaller Clayton not broken regulation 4, he would probably have had time to pull the signals off for the electric, but in the worst case, if he hadn’t had enough notice, It would have been a serious irregularity, a signal passed at danger, but not a fatal crash.
To try and understand why Mr Hardman did what he did, Colonel McMullen looked at the previous running of the service.
From 30th March to 14th August, 1953, the train was run 110 times. On 101 occasions the train was held at Queens Road home signal and it was stopped at the starter 29 times. On only 9 occasions it had a clear run through due to the late running of one of the two trains.
It was therefore only on rare occasions that the Junction distants were ever at Clear for the train. During the period the train was not once stopped at the Junction home signal. The crews who worked this train were very used to seeing a distant at caution, but a junction protecting main signal that had cleared by the time the train reached the junction.
With that in mind, and knowing that the train was mechanically sound, the Colonel simply concluded that Hardman, having assumed, due to his past experience, that the train would get a clear run through the Junction, relaxed his attention and simply did not look at the home signal.
__MUSIC SWELL__
This accident is a clear example of an accident that has been caused by Human Error.
Breaches of very clear regulations, designed to keep everybody safe. If they had been followed then this simply wouldn’t have occurred.
Now some of the developments made since would have prevented this accident from occurring. Automatic Warning System, AWS, which I mentioned last time might have alerted Driver Hardman and snapped him out of his complacency. Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS), another tool we will look at in the future, could have automatically applied the brakes if the train approached the danger signal too fast to stop for it, but these weren’t available yet.
So many of these systems are designed to catch us when we mess up. Fail-safes to prevent the mistakes of humans from causing people to lose their lives.
There are so many rules that traincrew, and signallers, and dispatchers and track-workers need to learn and follow on the network. The folder full of modules we all have is even called the rule book. Each of these rules exist for a reason. This was certainly the case in 1953. And Irk Valley clearly shows what can occur if they just aren’t followed.
__Closing monolouge__
The electrified line to Bury was closed in 1991. It was then converted into the very first line for Manchester’s tram network, the metrolink. While you can’t get the train over Collyhurst Viaduct no2, you now can get the tram over it. In fact the junction where this accident occurred is the point where the Metrolink Line to Oldham Branches off from the Bury Line. Trams leave Manchester Vistorias newly refurbished tram platforms and then you follow the route of the old electric trains.
The third rail system is replaced by overhead wires, but the visibility from the trams means that you can sit there among the commuters, many of whom may not even be aware of the events of that Saturday morning, and try to imagine what it may have looked like 70 years ago.
Closing Credits
Thank you yet again for tuning in to Signals to Danger. I’ve been, Dan. We’re still a fortnightly podcast so that means that the next episode will be released at midnight on the 11th October.
Once again, please connect with us on Social Media, we’re on Twitter and Facebook, share with your friends or colleagues, anybody you might think will be interested.
The more listeners I can get the more I can look at expanding the podcast.
I’ll always be grateful for very single listener but again, I’d be happy to welcome even more of you!
Till next time, travel safe!
