Signals to Danger

Season One – Episode 18 – Wootton Bassett

Podcast Introduction

Hello again, and welcome to Episode 18 of Signals to Danger.

I normally start by thanking you to all of your downloads, reviews and shares, and while I still very much feel that gratitude, what I actually want to do this time is thank you for your patience. It’s clear that this episode is about two weeks later thank we all expected, but unfortunately this is something that I do in my spare time and due to other commitments I’ve struggled to allocate that time till this week! Never fear though, normal service has now been resumed and I’m back into a normal release schedule.

I’ll keep posting updates on social media, and if you want to be part of that conversation, find me on twitter as either danielfoxrail or signalstodanger, or facebook and instagram as Signals to Danger.

Don’t forget that at signalstodanger.com you can find show notes, transcripts and some extra bits of info.

That’s also the place you’ll find opportunities to support the podcast as well including Patreon. I would love to take the opportunity to thank Ryan, Jay, Olly, Andrew, Matt, Simon and Peter for coming on board and supporting the podcast in this way.

This week might be a little different, because I’ve decided to look at an incident which could so easily have turned into disaster, but ended up being a terrifying near miss instead. A learning experience for the industry, and near misses are just as serious as accidents as far as safety is concerned.

With this in mind I think it’s time to start discussing this weeks topic!

Prelude

This weeks episode is a little different to others, unusually, in this case there was no wreckage to describe to you. No frantic, drastic rescue efforts to report back.

This weeks episode of the podcast is a lesson in the fact that despite everything that we can put in place, is that sometimes, the only thing which prevents a disaster is a gap in time of just 44 seconds.

The year is 2015, and the place, Wooton Bassett.

<opening credits>

Episode Introduction

This is Signals to Danger, A podcast where we look at major rail disasters which have occurred in the UK, explain what happened, how the investigation was carried out, and how each of these accidents shaped the industry going forwards.

I’m Dan, I’m work within the rail industry in my day to day life but today I’ll be the one taking you through this podcast.

We start every episode by briefly revisiting the events which were taking place at the time, but admittedly this isn’t quite as far back as some of the others, because the year was 2015.

The year kicked off with the most recent in a stream of European terrorist attacks, as gunmen stormed the offices of the Satirical french newspaper, Charlie Hebdo, and a siege of a Hypercacher kosher supermarket in Paris. Over the course of 2 days 17 lives would be lost to the attacks.

February brought with it news of UK Schoolgirls headed to Syria to join ISIL and the imprisonment of pop star Gary Glitter for crimes I won’t even go into here.

On the 10^th March one of the most famous Fracas of recent times takes place, as Jeremy Clarkson manages to get himself dropped from one of the BBC’s flagship programs, and a week later the nations sees an admission by Chief Superintendent David Duckenfield, of the South Yorkshire polise, that his failure to shut a tunnel to football terraces was the direct cause of ninety-six deaths at the Hillsborough disaster in 1989.

August saw the crash of a Hawker Hunter jet at the Shorham airshow, a disaster made all the more terrible by the fact that camera phones and internet sharing meant we all saw the images of the aftermath so soon following the disaster which claimed 11 lives.

At the back end of the year Paris sees a horrendous kind of bookmark, when a second series of co-ordinated terror attacks claimed the lives of 130 in the city on the 13^th November. The deadliest part of this attach was the mass shooting at the Bataclan theater.

2015 was a bit of a dark year at times, but unfortunately that’s the world we lived in at the time…

<Musical interlude> TEMPLE OF RUNHA

Introduction to West Coast Railways

As much as that run down may have left a bit of a sour taste, not everything that was taking place in 2015 was doom and gloom. Admittedly it was a darker time in modern history but in the finest form of the great British public we didn’t let it prevent us from enjoying ourselves.

The year came with many opportunities for people to unwind and escape from the bad news which seemed to litter the news websites and the television screens. Holidays and days out were just as accessible as ever, well, maybe not when we consider the last year, but I’m sure you get my point.

Seasides, Museums, play areas and well, lets face it, pubs continued to fill up with people over the course of the year, but this certainly isn’t an exhaustive list of fun things to do! These are admittadly some of the better known, more broadly accepted options, but there are a plethora of more, well niche ways to spend time. Many of these revolve around the great British love of the railway. Hobbyists build their scale models of countryside stations, in attics and garages and Train spotters, or “railway enthusiasts”, set up camp at junctions and bridges, armed with notebooks and cameras.

One such example of the railway hobby, is those who go out and about on Railtours.

A railtour is a chance for people to experience rail travel in a way that the general day to day service doesn’t provide. For most of the people who get on the railway every day it is a means to an end. A way of getting to where you need to be, a journey and not the destination. But there are those who see this the other way round. Those who enjoy the railway for the intricate beast it is, I’m probably to be counted as one if I’m honest.

Railtours provide people with an alternative way of spending time on the rails. They’re normally themed about one or more “unusual” factors. Things that set the charter aside from the everyday service.

Quite often, its the traction, the locomotive hauling the train. A big fan favourite has always been the sight, sounds and smells of a journey on a propper steam train, or the throwback to the time of BR era diesels.

Quite often some of the most sought after railtours are the ones dragged behind a special loco, if you get a seat on a carriage behind the only mainline certified Deltic? Thats a hot ticket on this scene.

The whole draw of the tour might be the enjoyment of Pullman dining. Silver service, fine food and drink with the moving scenery of the English countryside.

Railtours can also be themed around the route that they take, a run around on freight only lines, or soon to be closed routes. Whatever the draw, whatever the theme, it’s clear railtours are big business. Every year hundreds of them run from new years eve all the way though to new years eve.

And they’re a business which needs to be catered for. Locos, carriages and staff need to be sourced to provide the whole affair and due to the fact that railtours are predominantly based on unusual journeys, you’re unlikely to be able to bob down to your local branch of LNER or Scotrail to pick up a train and a driver.

Because of this, there is a number of companies that have sprung up to own and maintain locos and stock, as well as running the services themselves or promoting them. Companies such as Vintage Trains, The Railway Touring Company or Northern Belle.

And this is where we fold back into todays story. One of the largest companies involved in the Railtour scene is known as West Coast Railways. In 1998 the company became the first private business to be granted an license as a train operating company.

They operate a fleet of diesel locomotives from the BR Era, as well as running steam locomotives on tours. While they don’t own the steam locos, they run them on the mainline as part of tours. The diesels however are part of the estate. This is not a small, shed run business, it’s one of the largest companies providing these very specific services.

Large though it is, west coast railways is nothing in size compared to a large main line operating Train Operating Company or TOC, such as First Great Western. This TOC has responsibility for passenger services across the south west of England, and run hundreds of trains every day. These are a little less exciting to the heritage crowd however.

As uninteresting as it might sound in this context, GWR certainly has a role to play in the story of the 7^th March 2015.

<musical swell> ITS PERILOUS

The Trains and their journey

Like many of the episodes we’ve discussed before, this is a tale of two trains. One a mainline, timetabled passenger service, and the other a railtour, a heritage service running on the mainline network.

Firstly, lets discuss 1L76, the “normal” train. Operated by First Great Western, this was an Intercity 125, or rather more specifically 9 passenger carriages, sandwiched between two class 43 power cars. At 1528, this service had departed from Swansea, headed along the West Coast Main line towards the capital. We’ve covered this route before, in a number of eposdoes, but to refresh it in your mind, the West Coast Main line specifically runs between Bristol and London, and is one of the key routes across this part of the country.

As it leaves Bristol it weaves throught the countryside, and approaching the halfway point you find the town of Swindon. A big railway town itself, Swindon is a key location on the line. Just under an hour outside the capital means it’s commutable and so trains are frequent and fast.

It was this part of the world that 1L76 found itself at around half past 5 in the evening, on the 3^rd, about 240 passengers riding along in its carriages.

But it’s clear from the intro to this episode, discussing railtours, that Lima 76 is not the only train we’ll be discussing today.

The other is 1z67.

Many railtours carry a name, a point to be reminiscient about, and Z67 was no exception. This was the Cathedrals Express charter between Bristol Temple Meads and Southend East. The name was a call back to the named passenger service of the same name which used to run in Western Region of British Rail.

In it’s original guise it connected the cathedral cities of Hereford and Worcester to London Paddington and ran between 1957 and 1965. The last named service with a seperate headboard which BR introduced, the name has been used for a fair few railtours in a fair few different locations, on this occasion it was a bristol to southend train.

1Z67 consisted of 13 passenger carriages, but these were very different from the carriages on the swansea train. Mk one and mark two coaches, built between the 50s and 70s. These are fairly standard fare for heritage railtours, and are in keeping with the traction at the head end.

Being older stock they are of a construction that fits the time, mark ones with under frames with a body attached to the top of it, and mark twos with a semi integral structure. Despite their age they weren’t slouching, with 477 passengers on board and 37 staff in the carriages serving them food, drink and generally serving as support staff.

A ride in this sort of stock is one of the big draws for people on a rail tour, but being honest, it’s not the main reason people pay the money and take the day out of their calendar. This is normally what’s sat at the lead end of the train.

I’m a big fan of the class 43s which sat at the front and rear of the First Great Western Service. They represent one of the true triumphs of British engineering and design, and they have been plying their trade up and down the UK for 43 years, in fact we’re only just going through a phasing out of a great number of them as new stock is introduced on various routes. But the fact that they’ve been all over, for four decades, means that they’re not that interesting, at least not from a railtour point of view. What was a much rarer sight was what was heading up 1Z67.

34 067. Also known as Tangmere. Built in September of 1947 Tangmere is a Battle of Britain class Steam locomotive. An 86 tonne hunk of metal, the locomotive was withdrawn from passenger service in 1963, but was lucky enough to be preserved. It’s now one of a limited number of steam locos which have a mainline certification, enabling them to run trains away from heritage lines and on the main in between other scheduled services.

This was the draw for the nearly 500 people in the train behind. The chance to go back to the 40s or 50s, to be drawn along the railway at speed, the steam from Tangmere carrying back along the carriages. The smell of grease and oil and smoke and the romance. The sound of pistons and rods and steam pulsing from the chimney. That is why 477 people had tickets for the charter.

The jounrey had started at 0722 in the morning under a different headcode 1Z21. The train ran from Southend as far as Southall, where at 0936 two locomotives on it were removed. They were replaced with Tangmere, which hauled the service on to Bristol Temple Meads, arriving at 1311. The train was then moved to a nearby siding, and the loco and it’s support coach split off and were taken onto a nearby depot for a time. It was later taken back off, and coupled up to the coaching stock in the nearby sidings and run back into the station in time to pick up the passengers again.

The means that shortly before 0530pm on the 7^th March we had two trains, one eastbound on the Great Western Mainline from Bristol and one eastbound on the Badminton Line, which ran in from Swansea and Cardiff. And at Royal Wooton Bassatt there was a junction where these two lines met, and continued on together. Both of these trains were rapidly approaching that point.

<Musical Interlude> WHERE DOES IT END

The Near miss

The journey of one of our trains was fairly uneventful throughout. 1L76, the First Great Western Service ran east on the Badminton lines. It approached the town of Royal Wooton Bassett at line speed, 70 miles an hour, booked to run from the Up Badminton, through the junction and on to the Up Main towards Swindon. With priority this train approached the junction under green signals, approching without any need for caution.

And this planned movement, this timetabled route and path is exactly what took place. 1L76 left the Up Badminton at 70 miles an hour and ran through Wooton Bassatt Junction on to the Up Main.

Unhindered, unchecked by signals and without incident. However, it wasn’t quite as simple as that, or else we wouldn’t be discussing it now.

The point of interest, is what happened 44 seconds after L76 passed over the switch at Wooton Bassett Junction.

Tangmere, at the head of the charter service, ground to a halt over the junction, fouling, which means blocking, both the crossovers from the up and down badminton lines. It shouldn’t have been here, the signals on the Up Main had been set to danger to protect the High Speed Train as it joined from the badminton lines. Or at least they should have been.

The driver on the footplate, Melvyn Cox, made an emergency call to the signaller. He knew at this point that something had gone wrong, he was abundantly aware, because as he had approached signal number SN45 at 53 miles an hour, the signal protecting Wooton bassett junction, he had seen that it was red. I imagine he felt a serious amount of fear at this, and he applied the trains brakes fully. When he did this he was probably around 225 metres from the signal.

The train slowed, but not enough, and it passed the signal, the red light looming it was still travelling at some speed. For another 550 metres Tangemere slowed painfully until it finally came to a stand blocking the line.

A call was made immediately to the signaller, to inform him that a signal had been passed at danger. I’m sure Cox was scared up until that point. A red signal could easily have indicted that the route was set for an opposing train, and he might be in a position of extreme danger. The signaller was aware that the High Speed Train had already passed though the junction, in fact he had already set the points for Tangmere to pass through, he just hadn’t yet been able to clear the signal.

Whenever a driver reports a Signal Passed at Danger, there is a set process that must be followed. The main question that needed to be asked was why had the signal been passed? The simplest version is the SPAD. A signal passed at danger due to an unauthorised movement. This equates simply to a driver simply not obeying it, either through distraction or some other reason.

However sometimes the SPAD is due to a more technical reason. A signal failure, perhaps a signal put back to danger by a signaller or a power failure. In one of these circumstances the SPAD is treated differently. And on this occasion, Cox’s conversation led to this route of inquiry. As he spoke to the signaler in Swindon Power Signal Box, he told him how the signal preceeding SN45, SN53, had been showing a green aspect, a proceed and not a yellow for caution. This, he told the signaller, gave him no reason to check his speed, and led to him passing SN45 by half a kilometre.

The signaller worked through a signalling irregularity form with him over the radio, and marked SN43 as a defective signal. Cox was authorised to proceed on to Swindon, the next station on the route, and testing was arranged for SN43.

All was not as it seemed however, and quickly Network rail ascertained that this was no signalling irregualrity, this had been a category A SPAD. SN43 had shown a caution, and Cox had missed it. He had passed a signal, at danger, with no authortity and left himself, 38 other members of staff and 477 passengers at risk of collision with another train. Disaster had been averted by 44 seconds. The length of time it takes a high speed train to travel a mile and a half.

Due to the potential severity of this incident, the RAIB, the Rail Accident Investigation Branch took the decision to launch a full investigation into the dangerous occurance.

It was time to understand what went wrong

<Musical Interlude sad/dramatic – Reprise?> AND WE WALK AFTER

Introduction to the Investigation

The RAIB investigates accidents, this much is clear. As I’ve said what feels like a million times before, the reason they investigate accidents is to learn from them, and prevent them from happening again.

Sometimes mistakes are made, and we have near misses but an accident doesn’t take place. Which is great, and I’m really not downplaying how good that is, but sometimes that is just down to blind luck. The fact that an accident didn’t take place doesn’t mean that it couldn’t have easily taken place. Had the First Great Western service been delayed by a minute earlier in it’s journey, or Tangmere a minute earlier, those two trains would have been on the very same section of track, at the very same time.

I for one don’t want to know what a 90 tonne hunk of metal full of boiling water, fire and high pressure steam would have done to a modern passenger carriage, or how the 50ish year old carriages on the Cathedrals Express would have coped with the business end of a high speed train, and timing was all that prevented us finding out.

There is a whole area of health and safety which deals with this sort of thing, it’s called the near-miss.

It would be easy to not investigate them, nobody got hurt, nothing got damaged. But what about next time the same circumstances line up? No, you can’t just leave it. So you investigate them just as fully as you would an actual accident, and this is exactly what happened here. The RAIB investigated this as a “dangerous occurance”.

The focus of their investigation? Finding the answers to these key questions;

1. Firstly, the immediate cause of the accident, what was the reason that 1Z67 passed the signal when it was displaying a danger aspect.

2. Secondly, was there any safety features that could have prevented the SPAD from taking place? And if there was, why hadn’t they worked.

3. Were there any wider issues within West Coast Railways that might well have contributed to the accident?

<Musical Interlude> AND WE WALK AFTER REPRISE

What was the reason for the SPAD?

The answer to that first question, the immediate cause was quite simple, well they tend to be, the immediate causes.

The report lists it as;

“Train 1Z67 approached signal SN45 at too high a speed to stop before passing the signal at danger and coming to a stand across Wootton Bassett Junction.”

And that’s pretty accurate. By the time Cox became aware of the danger signal he was simply unable to stop in time, his speed was too high.

It doesn’t however really answer the stuff we need to know, but as ever, that will become apparent in the causal factors.

The first of which is that witness evidence and the GSM-R call made to the signaller after the SPAD indicated that Cox was not aware that SN43 had been displaying a caution aspect or possibly more realistically, that he had missed the signal. This meant that he had not reduced the speed of the train in anticipation of signal SN45 being at danger and was consequently unable to stop the train in time to prevent an overrun across the Up Badminton line, where it potentially could have conflicted with the movement of train 1L76.

When the report looked at Cox’s recollection of SN43, he actually said that he could not recall seeing it, most likely because his attention was focussed on other things going on inside the cab.

There was a further concern raised about some issues with visibility from the cab. Steam locos, by design, have a big old boiler at the front of them, with the cab to the rear. This means that forward visibility is through small forward facing windows at either side of the cab, or by leaning out of the cab windows. Crews who work these trains are used to the difficulty inherit by this arrangement, but sometimes additional issues compound the problem. On this journey visibility was reduced due to both condensation on the left hand window caused by a steam leak. The situation was not helped by the fact that the exhaust of the loco was also being blown to the left side of the boiler where it was accumulating.

To mitigate from these problems, Cox had decided to drive for much of the journey with his head out of the window. He still failed to see or react to the cautionary aspect at the signal.

As the investigation continued, reasons for this became clearer, and I know normally the first question is normally the longest answer in these episodes, however this time, the most interesting answer is probably to be found in section two.

<musical interlude> IN THE AFTERMATH

Where there any safety systems in place that could have prevented it?

The second question, were there any safety features that could have prevented the SPAD from taking place? And the answer was, in very simple terms, yes. But I think it is incredibly clear that something went wrong.

Mainline railway locomotives, multiple units and other vehicles are all fitted with a wide range of safety systems as standard. They are a requirement and they form part and parcel of the wider safety system. The two keys ones are something that if you’ve listened to the podcast before you know all about. AWS and TPWS.

AWS is the Automatic Warning System and TPWS the Train Protection and Warning System, and both form a really good safeguard, particularly at signals. For those of you who haven’t listened to the podcast before, or need a quick refresh, I’ll very briefly run through both.

The Automatic Warning System consists of magnets in the gap between the rails, normally two, a permanent magnet, always on, and an electromagnet that can be turned on and off. These magnets form a structure called the AWS ramp, and you’ve probably seen these before, painted yellow or green with a slope at least one end.

When a train passes over the permanent magnet a sensor on the train starts a countdown. If the signal attached to the ramp is clear, the electromagnet is turned on, and when the sensor detects that it resets the AWS system and sounds a bell in the cab. If the signal is not clear, the electromagnet is off, and so the system is not reset. This means that a horn sounds in the cab, and if it isn’t acknowledged in a set time frame, an automatic brake demand is generated which will bring the train to a stand.

TPWS is fairly similar. The system relies on equipment mounted in between the tracks as well, but the focus here is on speed. The TPWS equipment is called grids, and you’ve probably seen this as well, metal, rectangular grids, fairly what it says on the tin.

A pair of electronic loops is placed between 50–450 metres on the approach side of the signal, energized when it is at danger. The distance between the loops determines the minimum speed at which the on board equipment will apply the train’s emergency brake. When the train’s TPWS receiver passes over the first loop a timer begins to count down. If the second loop is passed before the timer has reached zero, the TPWS will activate. The greater the line speed, the more widely spaced they will be. It essentially means that if the train is travelling too fast to stop in time for the signal, then the system will make it stop

There is another pair of loops at the signal, also energised when the signal is at danger. These are end to end, and thus will initiate a brake application on a train about to pass a signal at danger regardless of speed, this should mean that an AWS warning incorrectly acknowledged but not acted on will be mitigated in this way.

So yes, very safe, and incredibly useful in preventing accidents on stock which was introduced following it’s conception, but as I said earlier, Tangmere was built in 1947, not exactly last year, so it probably doesn’t have these useful and well, life changing systems right?

Well, no, not exactly, Tangmere did have them, both of them.

Between 2001 and 2004 Tangmere was rebuilt almost from scrap so that it could run on the mainline. At this point was she fitted with air braking and AWS and TPWS systems as part of the programme. A combined electronic AWS/ TPWS control unit and an electronic AWS audible warning indicator unit were installed as well as an orange flashing light which would flash whenever the AWS warning horn sounded.

So even if Cox had missed the cautionary aspect at SN43, he should have been snapped back into concentration with a warning horn and a flashing yellow light above his head. So why wasn’t he?

The answer to this question would be the key to the whole mystery.

As part of the installation of the combined AWS/TPWS system was an isolating cock. In fact most safety systems on trains can be isolated, or temporarily turned off. This is for a very simple reason, sometimes these systems break, and if your system which automatically applies the breaks cant be turned off it could be quite challenging to take the train somewhere to fix it.

Understandably there are some very strict and tightly controlled reasons you’re allowed to isolate these systems, and as such, they controls, be it a breaker, a leaver or a cock normally come with a seal which needs to be broken to isolate it. In fact the intact seal formed part of the daily “fitness to run” check which Tangmere was subjected to.

Which leads the sequence of events which took place in the cab so surprising.

On the day of the incident there was an additional factor which added some marginal complications to the signalling and AWS experience on the Great Western Mainline. Nothing out of the ordinary I must add, something any mainline driver should be able to handle, but an additional factor.

Between SN43 and SN45 there was a temporary speed restriction of 85 miles an hour. This wouldn’t affect Cox particlularly, as the Cathedrals charter was travelling between 20 and 30 miles an hour below that speed, but it did mean that there would be more AWS alerts to manage.

As I’ve covered in previous episodes, most notably Nuneaton, for some time now a temporary permanent AWS magnet has been used as part of the protection for temporary speed restrictions, an extra bonus warning to ensure drivers remember to reduce their speed, if you listened to the Nuneaton Episode you’ll understand why this is important.

As Tangmere approached SN43, which was at caution, it passed over the temporary magnet for the speed restriction. As expected an AWS warning occurred. The orange light flashed, the AWS indicator in the cab turned yellow and an electronic horn sounded.

Drivers have around 2 seconds to acknowledge the warning before the brakes are automatically applied. The on train data recorder also fitted as part of the refurbishment recorded how long Cox took to hit the button. 4.1 seconds. He’d missed the cut-off. The electronic AWS/TPWS control module had already generated a brake demand before the time that he cancelled it and the trains brakes had applied.

We’ve mentioned the rulebook before, the bible of the railway. The book is a modular folder which includes all of the rules, methods of work and standards which govern the safe management of the railway. One very specific rule included withing governs what happens if a driver recieves an AWS or TPWS brake demand. If this brake demand occurs then the driver is required to bring his train to a stand and contact the signaller. Like pretty much everything contained within the rulebook it is unambiguous, black and white and not open to interpretation.

Which is why what happened next was so surprising.

Cox indicated to his fireman that they’d received an AWS brake demand. Instead of bringing his service to the stand as he was obliged to do, The firemans perception of the situation was that he was being instructed to do what he did next. He moved across the cab and leaned down under the drivers seat. He then turned the handle of the AWS isolation cock, isolating the AWS system. Cox didn’t complain, he didn’t tell off the fireman. I think this is supportive of the firemans understanding of the instructions.

Because the AWS system was isolated, the brake demand ceased to be effective after 12 seconds, only reducing the speed of the train by 8 miles an hour. It’s clear it wasn’t brought to a stand, and that the signaller wasn’t cancelled. The cock remained open for the remainder of the incident.

To add to everything that was going on in the cab, in the time before the AWS brake demand was cancelled, Cox received a further AWS warning. This was the one attached to the signal, SN43, and would have only have sounded had the signal been showing a caution or danger aspect.

And Cox responded to this one, in half a second. He hit the acknowledge button and the the alert cleared. But he didn’t seem to do anything in response to it. This was because witness evidence suggested that he was unaware that he had received two separate AWS warnings. He instead believed, very erroneously, that he had received only a single AWS warning and that this was associated with the speed restriction. This meant that the AWS warning relating to signal SN43 did not alert the driver either that he had passed signal SN43 or that it was displaying a caution aspect.

And this shouldn’t have been the case, there had been two clear AWS indications, and they were already dealing with the brake demand from the first when the second occurred. In any case this is what happened.

A point worth noting, had the AWS brake demand been responded to correctly and the Cathedrals express brought to a standard, missing the adverse aspect on SN43 would have been a moot point, as SN45 would more likely than not have cleared by the time movement was authorised again.

But this is not what happened, and Tangmere continued on past SN43, heading towards SN45, 2 kilometres away, with a steady red light lit.

As it continued towards the signal , Tangemere encountered the first set of TPWS grids. Due to the high speed of the line this signal was fitted with two sets. The first one, further away from the signal was set to 65mph, so any train faster will have it’s brakes applied. Tangmere was travelling at 52, so no application needed.

About 350 metres from the signal, there’s a second set of grids, set to 45mph. When Tangmere approached the grids it was travelling at a speed of 53miles an hour, too fast for a train prepareing to stop at the signal. TPWS was designed to intervene in this situation, it’s what it was made for. The combined AWS/TPWS control unit interacted correctly with the grids and sent a signal for a brake demand to the valve which would make it happen. This should have brought the charter train to an emergency stop.

But its clear that it didn’t, because the AWS isolating cock was still open, and this brake demand had no impact whatsoever, the train continued on for another 100 metres or so until Cox saw the red light at SN45, and put the brake in himself, too little, too late.

The RAIB interviewed both members of the footplate crew, and it was clear that they seemed to have a low perception of the a low perception of the risks of using the AWS isolating cock in order to by-pass the AWS brake demand. Witness evidence was that neither the driver nor the fireman fully understood that opening the AWS isolating cock would also effectively disable the TPWS system and this lack of understanding may have in part helped to create this perception.

In fact The RAIB spoke to a number of witnesses familiar with the operation of Tangmere

who stated that the incident on 7 March 2015 was not the only occasion on which

the AWS isolating cock was used to by-pass an AWS brake demand on this

locomotive. While some witnesses denied that it had become accepted practice

by train crews on Tangmere to do this, others estimated that the isolating cock

was used in this way at a frequency which ranged from virtually every journey to

two or three times over a period of several years. Clearly the problem was bigger than this one incident, and it just so happened this was the time the factors aligned and led to danger.

<Musical interlude Longer?> HYPNOTIC

The “safety culture” of West Coast Railways?

When we look at the way an operator instils safety rules and training within it’s team, and how well the business as a whole responds to and adheres to those rules, we call it the businesses safety culture. In fact the report itself catgorises a safety culture as ‘…the way safety is perceived, valued and prioritised in an organisation. It reflects the real commitment to safety at all levels in the organisation’

And as investigations continued, and the digging got deeper, it became clear that West Coast Railways had an increasingly questionable safety culture. In fact the report called it “weak” This brings us firmly into our third point of questioning.

We’ve already discussed that the crews weren’t aware of the risks of isolating the AWS cock, that they didn’t know that it would have affected other safety systems. But they should have known that, anybody operating such a serious and important piece of equipment should have had full knowledge as to what it was going to do. But it’s a bit of a moot point again, because train crews operating on the mainline should have had it drilled into them that they follow the rulebook. Overriding an AWS brake demand should have been a quick thought swiftly quashed by common sense at the very worst, it should never have come close to a conscious decision carried out by the crew.

But the fact that became apparent during the investigation was that this practice was not isolated to this incident. Even during the depot manoeuvrers at Bristol earlier in the day the cock had been used to override the AWS. And even at this point the lever was apparently without a seal. So maybe just this traincrew was doing it?

It would appear not, it seemed that this was regularly done, there was issues with the AWS installed on Tangmere, the horn was not always as audible as it should be, the footplate of a hard working steam loco is a noisy place, because of this some alerts were missed, and it had become somewhat of an established practice to isolate the system to bypass the demand to avoid the delays caused by coming to a halt, and having to build up momentum with a steam engine, I mean they’re not renowned for just pushing a lever and moving on demand.

In fact the use of this bypass was so prominent that the absence of a seal on the cock was never looked into. The Rule Book both required that the AWS isolating cock was sealed and that the seal be checked before the locomotive entered passenger service.. In general rail use the seals used are numbered, the numbers recorded and if any are found missing in the fitness for traffic inspection then this is investigated fully. It’s the whole point in a numbered seal. But WCR didn’t even record the number of the seals being fitted. They just stuck another one on every time it was missing.

Even Cox, when he took control of the loco, was obliged to check for a seal. But he didn’t, because, in his words, it wasn’t something he normally checked. In fact, in his experience, the isolating cock was never sealed; it is therefore unlikely that the absence of a seal would have struck him as being noteworthy on this occasion. This blasé attitude towards use of the AWS isolation is just a perfect example of an incredibly poor safety culture, through from the drivers using it to the inspectors not logging it and the management not investigating it.

If it feels as though the absence of the seal, or the importance of an isolated system is being drummed on a little too much in this investigation, I feel the need to tell you why.

On the 19^th September 1997 a Great Western High Speed train was driven from Swansea to London, just like the one in this story. The entire way back the train had it’s AWS system isolated due to a fault. The driver brought the train all the way to the outskirts of the capital, until he passed two caution signals. He didn’t notice them as he was distracted, when he saw the red it was too late. The HST collided with a freight train, causing 7 deaths. The place this took place was Southall.

Southall will form the basis of of an episode all on it’s own, that I can promise you, but, it perfectly highlights the dangers of running without these systems in use.

The outcomes of Southall led to some changes in the rules around isolated AWS, but we’ll get into that in more detail when we cover that episode, but we certainly have the understanding that to voluntarily turn off such a crucial system left Cox, his fireman and around 500 other people at a real, tangible risk of being the next Southall.

Moving aside from the actual incident, the report found some wider ranging issues with the safety culture of WCR. The RAIB’s investigation found that staff working for West Coast Railways did not effectively implement the requirements of the Rule Book, relevant railway group standards and the company’s safety management system on a number of occasions.

These included breaches in a number of areas:

1. Two members of the support crew were present in the cab of Tangmere when the incident occurred, although only one was permitted;

2. Driver Cox was not tested for drugs and alcohol immediately following the incident, a staple process of the industry.

3. The driver could not remember reading the Weekly notice which listed the speed restriction on 7 March 2015

4. l it had probably become an accepted practice for some train crew to use the AWS isolating cock to by-pass AWS brake demands

5. Drivers of trains 1Z21 and 1Z67 did not check that a seal was applied to the AWS isolating cock before entering their trains into passenger service

6. AWS isolating device seals were being removed and their removal was not being investigated

7. OTDR equipment on locomotives being operated by the company was not being maintained in accordance with the requirements

It’s not a short list, and it’s indicative of a company not meeting it’s obligations to running a safe train operating company. This safety culture clearly influenced the incident, and almost led to disaster.

<Musical Interlude> ENIGMA

What was the outcome of the incident?

While the RAIB ran their investigation over a prolonged period, as is the nature of these things, the outcomes of this incident were far faster for West Coast Railways. The SPAD at Wooton Bassett was listed as the most dangerous for a decade. Shortly after the meeting Network Rail and West Coast Railways met, and Network Rail walked away from that meeting voicing the opinion that at that meeting “WCR demonstrated that its controls, communication and commitment following the recent SPAD were inadequate” and that since then “the response by the senior management of WCR to the issues raised” had been “inadequate”. What followed next hit harder than those words ever could though.

On the second of April, Network Rail suspended West Coast Railways track access stating that;

“Network Rail has had concerns about WCR’s performance of its Safety Obligations for some time and recent events lead Network Rail to believe that the operations of WCR are a threat to the safe operation of the railway”.

Words were not minced. The notice gave 7 steps which WCR could carry out to lift the restriction, 5 of which should be implemented within 2 weeks. All of which related to improvements in the safety management system of the operator.

After 5 weeks the ban was lifted, following demonstrations that WCR had made sweeping improvements to the safety culture, and the methods of work.

Lessons learned at last. Or so it seemed.

In October of 2015 an incident occurred at Doncaster, in the course of the investigation it was discovered that another steam locomotive operated by WCR, an LMS ‘Black 5’ had had its TPWS isolated by the staff on board. In November, the Office of Rail and Road, the ORR, carried out enforcement action which prohibited WCR from operating mainline steam services.

Following this, in February of 2016 the ORR issued a prohibition notice to WCR, preventing them from operating heritage services on the main line all together. It was a revocation of their safety certificate, and the wording was unequivocal;

“WCRC are no longer able to operate trains on the mainline network until such time as they can satisfy us that its governance and operations meet industry practice and are fit for the scale of its operations”

The only concession made was a delay allowing WCR to move it’s stock to appropriate locations. The impact on the heritage rail scene was not inconsiderate, taking into account the scale of WCRs operations, however that probably makes it scarier to consider the contents of this episode.

With regards to this specific incident, The ORR didn’t let the issues raised escape scrutiny, and brought a prosecution forward for offences under the health and safety at work act. The company was charged with offences related to managerial controls, but perhaps more rarely, Melvyn Cox, a train driver with 40 years experience who quite frankly should have known better, faced charges levelled against him directly.

The outcome of both cases? West coast railway was fined 200,000 pounds for their health and safety breaches and ordered to pay 64000 costs. Cox received a four-month prison sentence, suspended for 18 months.

Musical interlude into credits? ENIGMA REPRISE

Episode Conclusion – Memorial and poignancy please.

West coast railways was yet again granted permission to run services on the UK rail network, and remains one of the largest companies providing such a niche service, and it seems as though the directives to rectify the issues with their safety management system have been heeded.

Over the last year Railtours, like, well most sources of entertainment, have disappeared into the place we store memories, but hopefully we’ll start to see them coming back, in the same way that pubs are now able to open their beer gardens, and soon we’ll see the hospitality sector coming to life. The fact is that railtours are now being advertised, tickets booked and plans made.

Wooton Bassett is a terrifying example of how all the safety systems in the world can’t overcome somebody who is intent on breaking rules. This is the reason our industry is so black and white, our instructions are so unambiguous and methods of work are so enshrined. Because if you keep cutting corners, eventually you cut too far, and run the risk of disaster.

<CREDITS> COLD CONCLUSION

Thank you as for tuning into episode 18, Once again, thank you so much for your patience in waiting for this episode to come out.

Please like, share and review, come interact with us on social media, twitter or facebook, just search for Signals To Danger or Daniel Fox Rail.

If you do want to support the podcast, get yourself over to signalstodanger.com, and either look at the support or shop pages.

Until next episode, Travel Safe!

Podcast Introduction

Hello again, and welcome to Episode 17 of Signals to Danger.

Thanks everybody who’s coming back every episode to listen to me tell the stories of these accidents and their victims, and for the likes and shares, and the interaction I’ve had on social media. If you want to be part of that conversation, look for either danielfoxrail or signalstodanger on twitter, or signalstodanger on facebook and instagram.

If you want to see show notes, episode transcripts and some extra bits of info get yourself over to signalstodanger.com. That’s also where you’ll find opportunities to support the podcast, such as Patreon. I would love to take the opportunity to thank

I don’t normally do trigger warnings, quite frankly because I believe that the subject matter of the podcast serves as a bit of a warning in itself, but I will this time for a very specific reason. This accident features a train derailing, and colliding with a bridge. On Saturday evening, the 13^th March a Merseyrail train derailed and collided with a bridge. This seems to have been a far less severe affair than what we’re about to discuss, and the details are still very much emerging, but I thought it might be prudent to throw this in here this week.

Nice quick intro this week, it seems as though it’s time for us to get cracking on Episode 16.

Prelude

The pile of debris was 100 yards long, several tall and consisted of steel, wood, glass and fabric. A piece of a carriage here, a section of bridge there.

In this suburb of the capital rescuers from all walks of live helped to dig through the wreckage to pull survivers free, but they had their work ahead of them.

The pile consisted of three separate trains, and everyone arriving on the scene knew that this, this was one of the bad ones.

The year, 1952. The place? Harrow and Wealdstone.

Episode Introduction

This is Signals to Danger, A podcast where we look at major rail disasters which have occurred in the UK, explain what happened, how the investigation was carried out, and how each of these accidents shaped the industry going forwards.

I’m Dan, I’m work within the rail industry in my day to day life but today I’ll be the one taking you through this podcast.

We start every episode by briefly revisiting the events which were taking place at the time, and this episode is no different.

The year is of course 1952, and in the history of the UK, it’s fairly significant. Not least because in January we saw our first glimpse of Sooty, a puppet beloved by generations of children, as well as the first TV detector van, to make sure everyone who watched him was doing so within the realms of the law. I think to this day you could walk into any pub and split the room 50 50 as to whether or not those things actually work.

The history of our nation takes a fairly substantial turn in February as God saves the King becomes God saves the Queen. George the sixth passes away at Sandringham and is succeeded by his 25 year old Daughter Elizabeth. There starts a nearly 70 year reign, still going to this date.

In May the first jet airliner, the UK built Dehavilland Comet takes to the skies, a symbol of british engineering prowess, and potentially paving the way for a UK led aviation production system. Well, if I was making this series about plane crashes and not trains let’s just say a comet episode wouldn’t be far off.

September saw 31 people killed as a prototype Dehavilland Sea Vixen broke up over the Farnborough Airshow and the debris landed on spectators, yet again proving that disasters are not just the curse of the railway.

October starts with two bangs, firstly a fairly sizable one as the UK detonates it’s first atomic bomb and 2 days later the end of tea rationing, this had been in place for 13 years and was putting a cramp on a quintisentially english tradition.

All of this brought us to the morning of the 8^th October, one of the darkest days of UK rail.

Introduction to Harrow & Wealdstone Station

If you were to look at a map of Greater London, you would see a 1500 square kilometre area, playing the role of home to just under 9 million people. A web of roads, millions of buildings and a swarming mass of people who live, work, visit and pass through the nations capital.

The entire city is criss-crossed with a network of steel rails. Above ground commuter trains rattle into the capital from all directions, bringing people in from the suburbs and surrounding towns. These trains are joined below the ground by the ones on the tube. The london underground, a tourist attraction in it’s own right. In addition to the commuter network in and around the city itself, this vast conurbation is the starting point for most of the countries major railway lines as well.

This is a fact I’m sure will have become clear over previous episodes. These lines spread out like arteries from the heart of the country. The Great Eastern Main Line out to Norwich, The Midland Main Line up to Nottingham and Sheffield, the Great Western out to Bristol and so on and so forth.

Within the city there are points where the main lines, commuter lines and underground lines all coincide. The termini of the main lines, stations like Kings Cross, Euston, Waterloo and Paddington all see the termination of long distance trains, local trains and they also all feature an underground station.

This mix of options isn’t just limited to the end of the line though. As you track out the main lines from the termini, you come across other locations where you find it. One such station is the scene of this tale.

The West Coast Main Line begins at London Euston, and we know it well from previous episodes, tales of Nuneaton and Grayrigg, however we’re focusing a lot further south today than those times. 11 miles and thirty chains from the buffers in Euston you reach the six platforms at Harrow and Wealdstone station.

This station is served by no less than four different operators. Southern Railways commuter offering between Milton Keynes and Clapham Junction, long distance services provided by London NorthWestern Railway and The Watford DC line of the London Overground are joined by the Northern Terminus of the Bakerloo line of the London Underground. And all of this is before you consider the non-stop West Coast Main Line services operated by Avanti.

In 2019 Harrow was the start or end of over 8 million journeys a year, over half of them on the underground, as people make their way in to jobs in the capital or on their leisure travel. Because of this platforms full of passengers are a regular sight, or rather, they were precovid.

Make no mistake, 69 years ago this was already a busy station, and when the morning rush hour came around hundreds of people flowed from the platforms at Harrow on to services into the heart of the city. The station on the morning of Wednesday the 8^th October 1952 was becoming as busy as any other as the city of London started to awaken…

The Trains and their journey

We know that the events at Harrow took place on the 8th October, but to really tell the narrative we actually need to wind the clock back almost exactly 12 hours from the moment everything went wrong.

At 8 15pm on 7th, the night before, a sleeper service drew out of Perth in Scotland and started it’s long journey first to Glasgow, and then it turned south and started down the West Coast Main line to England, through the picturesque countryside of the lake district, over Tebay and Shap, down through the Lune Gorge towards Carlisle, although, in the dead of night there’s not much to be seen be the glow of the fire from the cab. The 7th turned into the 8th as the train continued southbound.

While travelling through the North of England the weather started to turn, and fog became a slowing influence on the express. When it arrived at Crewe at around 20 past four in the morning it was already 13 minutes. There wasn’t time to be made up here unfortunately, as a 16 minute station duties time was all that had been allocated to change the locomotive and get the train set ready to depart. The locomotive being coupled on to the front of the Perth Express was no slouch.

Number 46242, City of Glasgow was based out of Camden depot in London. A prime example of the coronation class, built by the London Midland and Scottish in 1940, this 161 ton, 73 feet long living, breathing, well, beast, was capable of hauling heavy express trains at express speeds without breaking a sweat. Streamlined when it left the shop, this was one of the LMS’s premier locos, instantly recognisable as one of the western cousins to the LNERs A4s, the best known example of course being Mallard itself. Indeed the Coronation class and the A4s had a little jostling at one point for the speed record ultimately set by the LNERs Mallard.

In the late 40s the streamlining was removed to decrease weight and increase efficiency, and it was this more traditional looking version which was coupled to the front of the Perth express at around half 4 in the morning. On her spacious footplate was a crew of two, the driver, R.S. Jones, and his fireman, C. Turnock.

Jones had been driving trains for 4 and a half years, although he’d been a fireman for the 11 years prior and other roles “on the job” for the 10 years before that. Both men had worked this route before and had brought the loco north from the capital on a down express.

When the station clock ticked to 37 minutes past four, City of Glasgow drew out of Crewe with Jones’s hands at the control, 32 minutes late, but with one of the most powerful locomotives in the country at the head of the train there was a hope not much more speed or time would be lost.

The locomotive led 11 vehicles over the pointwork outside the station, a milk van, a brake van, four passenger carriages, four sleeping carriages and a final brake van. 525 tons of train in total, slowly building up speed as it started to head southbound.

It wasn’t only expresses setting out on the railway this morning, as City of Glasgow was working it’s way south, past Stafford, Nuneaton and Rugby and the sun was rising, another train was starting it’s day.

At 0731 a local train was just departing the town of Tring in Hertfordshire. This was a prime time commuter service, all stops to Watford, then though to Harrow and on to Euston, booked to arrive at 0827. Exactly the right time for a short walk to the office, or a change to the tube, or a bus.

With 53 year old Driver A.W Payne at the controls, supported by his fireman A.R.Hind, the train left Tring, and continued South towards London. Led by 42389, a tank engine, the 332 tonne train consisted of 9 compartment carriages, put together for mass transportation of the morning masses. Which would come in handy this morning. Due to some fairly extensive track and signalling work ongoing at Euston some other trains had been cancelled to alleviate pressure on the infrastructure. This meant that passengers were not going to be in short supply.

Unfortunately, the fog was prominent in this area too, and by Watford the local was already down by around 5 minutes, understandable considering the circumstances, but probably of some frustration to the hundreds starting to fill the 74 compartments of the train.

11 miles to the south of Harrow station was yet another train that we must concern ourselves with. The 8am departure from Euston was not a local train, nor was it hauled merely by a tank engine.

The Liverpool express was to run North at speed, delivering passengers to the port city without delay. 17 vehicles long, 11 of them passenger carriages, both third and first class. In addtion there were 4 brake vans on the train to provide additional luggage and goods space. But neither of these were the impressive thing about this train, that came at the front.

The Liverpool express was hauled by not one express passenger locomotive, but two. Heading up the train was number 45637, Windward Isles. 133 tons in weight, this LMS Jubilee Class Steamer was one of the workhorses of the West Coast, and it wasn’t alone on this journey.

Behind her was 46202 – Princess Anne. Princess Anna had started life as the Turbomotive, an expiremental loco which replaced the pistons with turbines, although in 1949 the turbine had failed, and a post war Britain didn’t really have the pennies to replace it, or rather it was considered uneconomical in the environment of austerity.

In 1952, two months before this date, a rebuild of the turbomotive had led to the creation of Princess Anne, a far more conventional Princess Royal Class, 159 tons heavy and 74 feet long and sitting in the lineup of a Down express.

The liverpool express tipped the scales at 737 tonnes, 293 of them at the very head of the train in the two locomotives, and at 5 past 8 in the morning, 5 minutes late, every one of them started to steam out of Euston’s platforms on the way north

Three separate trains on three separate journeys. One approaching it’s end, one just starting out and one everyday commute in full swing, all making their way up and down the West Coast Main line, all making their own way towards Harrow & Wealdstone.

The Accident & Aftermath

As the local train approached Harrow from the North it traversed a crossover from the Up Slow line to the Up Fast line. This directed it into platform four, full of passengers waiting to board the train for the journey into the city. Many of them were railway employees themselves, off to work in the Midland region offices close to Euston station, taking advantages of the service BR operated to get them into work.

As I said earlier, the next train was cancelled, so plenty were waiting for them on their arrival. Payne expertly brought the engine to a halt at the far end of the platform, his 9 carriages just accommodated. Almost immediately the compartment doors were opened, and people flooded on to the trains carriages.

The guard, Mr Merritt had been travelling in the brake compartment in the third coach from the rear of the train. With such a busy platform he walked forwards a little along it, and directed passengers to even board in the brake compartment. Both Payne and Hind on the footplate were conscious at the front that they had been stood a little longer than normal, but chalked it down to the heavy loadings. By the time they had been stood a minute or so, there was around 800 people in the 74 compartments of the local train. Next stop Euston. The brakes of the train were released anticipating the guards signal and the departure of the service.

Merritt started to walk back to the two carriages behind his brake compartment to close his doors, and that is when he heard something that filled him with dread.

From the Fog to the north he heard the Perth express approaching, at speed.

As soon as he saw it burst out of the fog he took cover under the coping stones of the Down Platform on the opposite side of the island platform. This quite possibly saved his life as Britain’s worst ever peacetime rail disaster started to take place.

At somewhere between 50 and 60 miles an hour the leading buffer beam of City of Glasgow slammed into the drawbar of the last coach of the local service. The 525 ton sleeper service played the part of the unstoppable force, the local an almost immovable object.

Because the brakes had been released the local train was actually pushed forwards around 20 yards, but this didn’t even remotely come close to absorbing the energy of the Sleeper. This was taken care of by the timber construction of bodies of the rearmost two carriages of the local. The underframe of the 9^th coach was thrust up and over that of the 8^th, and under that of the 7^th. All three carriages were compressed into a space the length of one of them, and their underframes were pushed up onto the platform to the left of the train. By some miracle however the other six carriages of the train were pushed forwards, and for the most part undamaged.

This sudden collision hadn’t just devastated the rear of the Local train however, and as the locomotive of the Perth Express had come to a sudden stop the tender had slewed around to the left, riding up against the frame of the cab and, damaging severely the footplate area. It ended up to the side of the wreckage of the local train, on the Down fast line, just under the station footbridge.

Behind that, the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, 4^th and 5^th vehicles were piled up behind, and above the loco, and their distorted underframes and bogies, together with some of the bogies of the local train, were compressed into a mass of wreckage about 100 ft. long covering the Up and Down Fast lines between the platforms.

This pile would have been difficult to unpick and to attribute the origin of each piece of wreckage would have been nigh on impossible. The bodies of the two leading two vans of the sleeper were of timber construction and rapidly became splinters as they rammed up against the tender of the City of Glasgow. The following 3 were dealt with equally as forcefully, and saw comprehensive damage as each slammed into the wreckage of the one before.

Further back than the sixth carriage of the sleeper though, damage became very minor and superficial, fixtures and fittings not critical damage.

And had everything stopped at that time, this would probably been one of the worst accidents that the country had ever seen. The forces involved, two busy trains, the time of the accident. It certaibly would have been remembered.

But a third part of the jigsaw fell into place almost immediately after the city of Glasgow collided with the rear of the local train at 60mph. 737 tons of the Liverpool express.

The leading locomotive of the Liverpool Train, Windward Isles, travelling at 60 miles an hour, collided with the City of Glasgow underneath the footbridge. She was diverted left and up, starting a terrifying journey over the island platfom separating the down fast and the up electric line, eventually coming to a rest lying on her left hand side on the up electric line. Princess Anne, the second locomotive was dragged along the platform at the same time, also ending up on her side on the very edge of the up electric platform. In total nearly 300 tonnes of loco had smashed across a passenger platform, and that’s without even considering the carriages behind.

The force of the collision had severely damage both engines, but Windward Isles to a whole different level. Except for the boiler, she was practically reduced to scrap. The bogie was wrecked and its component parts scattered, and the buffer beam and the frames were folded back as far as the leading coupled wheels. There was also very heavy damage at the rear end as the tender was driven into it. The report features a photograph of her, and you can’t help but wonder where the rest was.

The leading brake van followed the locos on to the platform, but it’s right hand side was ripped out by the underframe of the next carriage, the body of which was destroyed. The third vehicle also ended up here, but the fourth took a different path altogether.

As this one piled in to the wreckage of all the others, it was diverted to the right instead, up and over the wreckage of the local and the sleeper. The greater part of its roof at the rear was torn away and left behind as it was forced upward against the footbridge girders, and the brake and luggage compartments occupying the rear half of the coach were wrecked, and the carriage eventually came to a stand on the Up platform.

The fifth vehicle had its steel body crushed and lay near to the footbridge, but the next two, the 6^th and 7^th carriages ran straight ahead, over the wreckage rapidly piling up above the Up Line, coming to rest on top of it, the momentum of the impact carrying them over. One of these vehicles which ran under the bridge latched onto and pulled away one of the girders, ridding the bridge of some substantial components.

The 8^th vehicle of the Liverpool express contacted the rest of this wreckage next, but it was the last vehicle to do so, the energy of this disaster was finally dissipating. It was wedged under the footbridge (see photograph 10) with its leading end resting on a heap of five or six bogies and other debris, but its trailing bogie was still on the rails.

The final 7 vehicles of the Liverpool train came to a stand in the platform of the Down fast, undamaged, especially when compared to the rest of the train.

Finally, all three trains had come to a complete halt. Steam vented from destroyed boilers and wreckage began to settle. The time of the impact had been recorded for all to see, as the forces involved were so great it had stopped the station clock. 0819 AM. The echoes of the impacts began to fade, and they began to be replaced with moans and cries for help. These three trains had suddenly and violently come to share one section of track, and now the task of rescue and recovery needed to begin.

Immediately following the accident, telephone calls were made by station staff, suddenly confronted with the horrifying site which now covered half of the station platforms. The central location of the station in the town of Harrow meant that the emergency services weren’t far away, and the first ambulance arrived within three minutes of the accident. The numbers of ambulance men, doctors, and fire-crews only increased as the time ticked on. Railwaymen who had already started swarming over the wreckage were quickly joined by the prefessionals, including a medical unit from a nearby US airbase.

The first loaded ambulance left the site at 8.27 a.m. From that point there was a continuous stream of them heading to nearby hospitals up until 10.30 a.m., and by 12.15 p.m. the great majority of the injured had received first aid attention and had been conveyed to hospital.

Two further seriously injured cases were removed at 2.30 p.m., but it was not until 1.30 a.m. on the following morning, 9th October, that there appeared to be no chance at all of anyone being found alive in the debris of the coaches.

157 people were transferred to hospitals once they were rescued from the piles of debris which covered the fast, slow and electric lines at Harrow. 84 of them detained with many of them seeing very serious injuries. In total 340 were injured once the tally was completed.

It should come as no surprise that these were not the only people who fell victim to this disaster. The driver and fireman of the Perth express, R.S. Jones, and C. Turnock, and the driver of the leading liverpool engine all lost their lives. Unfortunately, they were joined by 7 passengers who had been travelling in the liverpool train, 23 from the Perth Train and then 64 from the local train.

There were 14 other deaths who couldn’t be attributed to any of the trains, but the horrifiying truth is that it is probable that some passengers who were waiting on the island platform between the Down Fast and Up Electric lines, and that they were caught by the derailed engines of the Liverpool train.

No less than 36 of the passengers who were killed and many of the injured were members of the Railway staff who were travelling to work in London, for them this was a normal commute to the offices, for so many of those who lost their lives this was just a normal journey.

For only the second time in the history of railways in this country, a death toll measured in three figures was returned by the accident at Harrow & Wealdstone station. That number?

One Hundred and Twelve lives lost.

Introduction to the Investigation

The death toll of 112 puts Harrow & Wealdstone in a firm second place for the deadliest train crashes in the UK, second only to Quintinshills 226. There were a number of differences between these two, and we will do an episode on Quintinshill at some point, we really need to cover it. One notable difference however was that Quintinshill took place in 1915, during the second world war, the railway was stretched to help fulfill the war effort and indeed one of the trains was a troop train, taking soldiers from Scotland to Liverpool to ship out. Harrow and Wealdstone took place under a normal timetable, without the additional stresses of war traffic. So how had a disaster on this scale taken place?

That was the question that the investigators needed to answer, but to achieve this they needed to break it down into several other questions.

• Firstly, What had led to the Perth train colliding with the rear of the local. What protections had been in place to keep these two trains separate, and how had they failed?

• Once the first collision had taken place, was there any manner in which the second, the one involving the liverpool train could have been avoided?

• Had the differing construction of the coaches contributed in any way to the survivability of the crash?

• Finally, had technology existed elsewhere which could have prevented, or reduced the severity of this accident if everything else had happened in the same way.

Why did the Sleeper Collide with the Local train?

To best understand the reasons that two trains had ended up on the very same section of track, we need to look at the way the railway was being worked at this time. It’s also worth bearing in mind that there was nothing wrong with the route of the Liverpool train, and had the down line not been fouled by wreckage it would have steamed through Harrow at speed and continued north without incident.

With regards to the local and the sleeper however, it was clear that they were both on the up fast. The line that ran through that platform at Harrow, and that they were there at the same time. This was very much against the basic principle of signalling, one train in one section at any one time. So what had gone wrong?

Harrow and Wealdstone Station had 6 lines which ran through it, the up and down electric, the up and down fast line, and the up and down slow. Which lines trains travelled on depended on the jounreys they were planned to take. Express trains with minimal stops were routed onto the fast lines, stopping or goods trains were routed via the slow, and the electic lines played host to the DC electric multiple units.

The Perth Express was very easy to categorise. It was an express service, travelling long distances and not calling at local stations. Due to this fact it had run on the fast lines wherever they were present. It was pathed to pass through the Up fast platform at Harrow and continue on the line past Wembley and down to Euston, so there was no question as to whether or not it was meant to be on this line.

How about the local train? This was a regularly stopping passenger train from the outskirts of greater London, and it had called at all stops before reaching Harrow. SO you would imagine it was to run through the station on the slow line, especially since it was stopping there and other services would not be.

This wasn’t quite the case though, up until Harrow the local service had run on the slow lines, stopping at each station, but on it’s approach to Harrow it was planned to cross over from the up slow line to the up fast line, to stop in platform 4 at the station. This was all as the timetable was booked, and not a decision that was made on the day.

There was a reason for this, I appreciate that it might seem a little unnecessary. From Harrow the local train was non-stop into Euston and unlikely to cause any delay or conflicts with other traffic. Running it via the fast lines also left the slow lines free for other movements, specifically in this case empty stock movements from willesdon depot. As an interesting aside, any booked move where passeger trains are running without being in passenger service are know as ECS moves, or empty coaching stock, even when they’re multiple units, not coaches persay. There headcodes also start with a 5 under numbering conventions but I’m getting on a little bit of a tangent here. The important thing is that we understand that the local train was booked to be transferred to the fast line here, and had just as much a right to be there as the express.

So we know that they were both booked to be there, it was clear however that it wasn’t supposed to be at the same time. Next steps? To understand what was in place to separate them.

The very basic answer was timetables. Both trains couldn’t pass though the same section of track at the same time, so the timetable wasn’t written that way. Even now, in theory, you could pick a section of rail and through the magic of timetables see exactly what trains were meant to be on it, at what time and in what order. This is even true of the most complex pieces of track, outside of the largest terminus stations.

Because of this, the timetable was planned so that these trains were going to pass at different times.

The perth express had been due to pass through Harrow at around 7am, the local at around 0815. Very nicely seperated from each other, but that only works if the rest of the world plays along.

Weather did not play ball on the morning of the 8^th. The local service left Tring on time, but fog slowed it down somewhat. By the time it left Watford it was 5 minutes down, progress slowed by the weather. This meant that it arrived at Harrow a little after 0815, crossing over from the slow lines into the fast.

The problem here was that the express was also affected by the weather and delayed. 13 minutes late arriving at Crewe, 32 minutes late leaving there. It then ran southbound to Watford, where it was slowed at Watford Tunnel by a 15mph speed restriction, well rather waiting for another train to transit the tunnel at that speed, and then to pass though itself.

By the time the sleeper reached Harrow, it was around 80 minutes late. This is what put it in platform 4 at 0819 in the morning, at the exact same time as the local service.

In the early days of the railway, a lot of the separation of services relied on this method, but, I’m sure you can see the problem, the weather, disruptive passengers, engineering issues and an ever lengthening list of potential issues means that relying soley on timetables would be nigh on impossible.

Which is why it’s a good point we blatantly don’t rely on this now, and they certainly didn’t in 1952. Delays brought the trains to the same place at the same time, but there are measures in place which should have meant that they didn’t physically try to share a piece of track.

Trains are signalled, they are provided signals from the lineside which instruct them whether or not they can proceed along, whether or not they need to take caution and be prepared to stop, amongst other things.

This is the case almost everywhere now and was the case outside Harrow. The method of signalling in October 1952 was absolute block.

We’ve covered Absolute Block a couple of times now, so I’ll give you the very pared down version. Each signal box is responsible for a section of track, they are offered trains by the next box down the line, and they can only accept them if their section is clear. They then offer their train on to the next box, and so on, and so forth.

To look after their sections, signal boxes are provided with signals, although this probably comes as no surprise.

A bog standard absolute Block system typically features a distant signal, at least one home signal and a starter. Home and Distant signals can only show clear or danger, and the distants can only show clear or caution. If either of the home signals are at danger, the distant must be at caution. This way a driver who sees the caution knows to slow down and be prepared to stop at the home signal.

This section of the west coast main line was controlled under absolute block, specifically from the Harrow Number One box. This box was responsible for signals on the up and down fast and slow lines, and the signals which controlled them.

Speaking of signals, a train approaching Harrow platform 4 on the up fast would see the following sequence;

2100 yards before the start of the platform was the up fast distant signal, a colour light signal which shows yellow for caution or green for proceed. 1400 yards further along the track was a semaphore signal, the Up Fast Outer Home, followed 450 yards later by the Up Fast Inner Home, directly before the crossover from the slow to the fast lines.

Once the train passed through the platform there was the Up Fast Starter and the Up Fast Advanced Starter controlling trains leaving the platform and handing them off to north wembley box. As you can see, quite an advancement on the very basic level, especially when you consider this is multiplied over two sets of up and down lines.

Which means we now need to ask a very important question, had the signals been set correctly? With the local train in platform 4, the signals should have been set to protect it. Because the local had crossed over from slow to the fast line at Harrow The Perth Express should have steamed on towards Harrow and seen a .caution aspect at the distant, and slowed in preperation to stop at the outer distant.

It’s clear it didn’t, nor did it stop at the Inner distant, so were the signals set correctly?

To clarify this most important of questions, the investigators started down a couple of lines of enquiry, and arguably the most important was talking to the signalman responsible, a Mr Armitage.

He told investigators how he had run trains through his section that morning. He;d been working since 6am, covering the box as a relief signaller, and at around half past had instigated fog working.

This knowledge was important, weather, visibility and what part they played were a really big consideration for this accident. We know that fog was a big part in how the trains were brought together, did it play a part in signals not being seen?

Under fog working trains must be kept two sections apart and of course this means less trains can run, especially in busy areas where it’s not unfeasable that every consecuitve section for a length of track could be occupied, it does however mitigate the risks of a signal passed at danger. Signalmen will impliment fog working when visibility means that they are unable to see their fog object.

At Harrow, the fog object was the Up Slow Home Signal, and at ten past 8 in the morning, Armitage decided he could see the signals and a way past them, the fog had thinned. 9 minutes before the collision he telephoned his control and sent the message, fog off, so visibility had lifted.

Jut prior to this, armitage had been offered two trains, a delayed express from Glasgow on the up fast, at 0758, and the local train, on the up slow at 7 minutes past. He accepted both into his section as both his fast and slow lines were clear. Two minutes later he received a signals to tell him the Glasgow express was entering his section, and at 11 minutes past 8 it steamed in on the up fast, past his box and through platform 4. Chillingly Armitage recalls the platform looking quite a bit busier than usual. Around the same time two other things happened. He received a signal to tell him the local train was approaching, and then he was offered the Perth express from the next box north.

Alot happened very quickly after this point, and this isn’t that unusual because this was a relatively busy section of line.

At some point here, but the couldn’t recall exactly when, Armitage set the crossover for the Local train from the Up slow to the Up fast. This was because a concious decision had been made that the local train was going to take precedence over the sleeper bearing down on the station, despite the fact the local was stopping here.

This might seem counter intuitive, and sort of goes against our instinctive feeling that expresses should probably be given priority. But, there was nothing wrong with this decision, in fact Armitage did exactly the right thing. Local instructions were given to provide priorty to local trains in this area instead of late running expresses from the North, and it makes sense really. Firstly, this local train was now running straight through to Euston, as was the express, but the express was 80 minutes late already. This local train would have additional workings throughout the morning and to delay that would have a greater affect on the timetable as a whole. And so armitage reversed the crossover to allow the local train to access the up fast, expecting to hold the sleeper at his outer home, which was set to danger.

With the outer home set to danger, the distant on the Up Fast showed caution, so 2000 yards along the track Driver Jones would see a yellow light, brake his train and hold it at the signals outside the station.

At 0814 Armitage received train entering section for the local train and offered it forwards to Wembley. He cleared the home signal on the slow line to allow the local train to approach the crossover and enter the up fast platform, this move protected by the Up Home signals and he also cleared the starting signals on the Up fast, to allow the local train to leave the platform. After the local passed the Up Slow signals he put them back to danger and recorded that the local arrived at the platform at 0817. Exactly in line with the time that he received a signal to tell him that the Perth Express, with City of Glasgow pulling hard at the head, was leaving the last section and entering his.

Armitage told how a minute or so later he was astonished to hear the sound of the Perth express approaching at speed, and he said that when he first saw it it was ” coming out of the mist and passing my Outer Home signal on the Up Fast ” (this signal is nearly 600 yards from the box, so it does tell us that visibility had improved somewhat).

He saw that it was making no attempt to stop so he took some swift action to try and stop the disaster he already knew was certain.

He threw a leaver which automatically placed three detonators on the fast line, these were later found to have exploded, but clearly hadn’t had much of an impact.

He also knew at this stage that the last thing he needed was another train entering this area, so he threw back the signal against the Liverpool express, which he knew was very much on it’s way. When he did so he heard the buzzer which warned him that the liverpool train was already occupying the track circuit he was trying to protect.

He recalled that the two impacts happened almost at the same time, he recorded the time in his log book and sent the signal to boxes either side. Obstruction. Danger.

Those who spoke to Armitage immediately afterwards said that he was shaken. In fact the stationmaster at Harrow went up to the box around 10 minutes after the collision. He found him to be ” deathly white ” and very upset, and he helped him out of the box to sit on the steps to get some air.

Although Armitage was clearly horrified by what he saw, his account was clear, he carried out his role as he saw fit, and to the rules of the position. Unfortunately the same account could not be obtained from the footplate crew of the perth sleeper, as neither survived the accident.

Without their version of events, and about 50 years too soon for forward facing CCTV, it was up to the instruments themselves to either prove or disprove Armitages account.

Within minutes of the accident taking place signalling engineers who had been traveling on the local train had been up to the box and recorded the position of the levers and before half an hour had elapsed, a lineman had been sent to go see what the signal positions and lights were showing.

Another later a telegraph inspector arrived, he checked the aspects each signal displayed, the repeaters in the box and the equipment within the box.

All of these reviews were unaninmous, the signals were showing as Armitage said they would have been, which led the investigation to come to the conclusion that no blame could be laid at his feet.

Which unfortunately meant that the report concluded that the fist collision resulted when Driver R. S. Jones did not reduce the speed of the Perth train in obedience to the Harrow No. 1 Up Fast Distant signal at caution, and subsequently passed the Outer and Inner Homes at danger.

The problem here was best worded by the report itself.

“Owing to the very regrettable death of the two men on the footplate, it is only possible to speculate on the circumstances of the human failure which brought about the first collision. Driver Jones was an engineman of considerable experience and mature age with a good record, and it appeared that he had been driving with proper caution during the journey from Crewe in the fog”

The investigation yet again turned towards visibility. The Harrow Up Distants are only 1,300 yards beyond Hatch End box, which Jones will have known he had passed, but by all accounts the visibility at these signals was not nearly so good as it was at Hatch End. It may have been 100 yards or less, and at 50 m.p.h. they would have been in a driver’s view for about four seconds only.

This is not a long time, but the colour lights are well sited and focused for observation from the left hand side of an engine, and two other drivers, who were travelling at much the same speed, had no difficulty in seeing them a few minutes earlier.

There was a question as to whether or not a train which passed shortly before may have left a pall of smoke in the vicinity of a bridge nearby, but such happenings are in the ordinary run of a driver’s xperience and if Driver Jones had been keeping the close and continuous look out which the conditions equired, he could hardly have missed an intense colour light which is so conspicuous at short range and was presented so close to his line of sight…

When the report was published, investigators could only suggest that Driver Jones must have relaxed his concentration on the signals for some unexplained reason, which may have been quite trivial, at any rate during the few seconds for which the Distant signal could have been seen from the engine at the speed he was running in a deceptive patch of denser fog. Having thus missed the Distant he may have continued forward, still expecting to see the colour light and not the Harrow semaphore stop signals which were at a considerably higher elevation. He may have suddenly

realised that he had missed the Distant when the signal box and the surroundings of Harrow station came into his view.

Without the ability to talk to Jones, or to see what he saw, we can’t really answer this question any more fully than that, but this was our reason the root cause for the first collision. Jones did not stop his train in response to the signals that had been meant to protect the local service.

Could the second collision have been prevented?

This second of the questions unfortunately had already been answered.

Under the set up of the signals here in North West London, there was no way that Armitage could have known that the Perth Sleeper had blown through the distant signals until he saw it, and by that point not only was there no chance of stopping that first collision, the liverpool express was already in the section and past any signals which could have slowed or stopped it.

Even if fancy automated signals or warning systems had been in place, the only point at which the Liverpool was in any danger was after the collision, when the wreckage of the other collision had strayed into its’ path.

Even if we transported this 60 or 70 years into the future, and added a GSM-R radio into the cabs, and Armitage was able to send a railways emergency call? It probably wouldn’t have made a difference. The time between the to collisions was so short that I don’t believe that there would have been an opportunity for any meaningful brakeing to take part. At one point in the report it states that it couldn’t be guaranteed that the Perth engine had completely come to a stand on the down line before the Liverpool hit it.

Once the pieces were in place, this accident was happening, and it was going to involve all three trains.

<Musical interlude>

Survivability of the coaching stock

In previous episodes we’ve talked about survivability of coaches following an accident, and here at Harrow the question was quite prominent. This accident took place at a point where some changes were being made in the construction of carriages on the network and the changes can be seen in the mixture of coaches involved in the crash.

There were a number of vehicles with an all timber body involved, the leading two vans of the Perth express were a perfect example, as were the rear two vehicles of the local train.

There were also a large number of carriages with steel panels and roofs, but timber framing, a bit of a middle ground, but very standard for the era.

The last type involved was only found on the Liverpool service, an all steel construction. Steel panels but with steel frames all welded.

As I’ve said in the past, although we’re comparing the performance of different types, it’s really worth baring in mind the fact the scale of this accident. As it says in the report;

An exceptional disaster such as this, in which enormous destructive forces were applied to a large

number of vehicles from different directions, can give no firm grounds for conclusions on the merits of different types of carriage construction from the safety point of view. I think, however, it is fair to say that the comparatively modern composite coach body, with sheet steel panels and roof and hard wood framing, is not in itself a great deal stronger in structural resistance to collision forces than the older all-timber construction.

The heavy steel underframes which have been adopted for all main line stock in recent years can sometimes give considerable protection against the crushing of the vehicle as a whole, but if overriding takes place their resistance is not brought into full play, and in these circumstances a heavy underframe may even add to the destruction by the well known telescoping effect.”

This is something we’ve seen before, the relative looseness of the chain and link coupling means that a greater amount of vertical movement is available, and during collisions coaches can be forced on top of each other, the underframes riding over other bodies.

The all-steel body shell mounted on a normal underframe was an improvement and has proved its value more than once in collisions where conditions were less severe. WE know that some coaches of the liverpool train which were of the all steel construction, however, the report continures to say that “no carriage body for service in this country can be built, even in steel, to withstand the very violent shocks which must have been received by the 5th coach of the Liverpool train.”

The other point that could have been influencial is not only the types of carriages, but the way that they were marshalled, or laid out in the train.

A prime example of this is the Perth Train. The leading two vehicles were a milk van and a brake van. The presence of these two bogie vans at the front of the train undoubtedly saved serious damage to the passenger coach marshalled 6th and to the following sleeping car.

The industry already recognised the value of such protection and instructions were issued to all Regions in 1948 that a brake van or vehicle with a brake compartment at the leading or trailing end should be marshalled at the front or rear of passenger trains wherever practicable.

<Musical interlude Longer?>

Could the accident have been prevented?

One of the biggest parts of any investigation, which will have become abundantly obvious in the past, is how best the industry can prevent reoccurrences.

Harrow was horrific. Only the second time in our railways history that a death toll ran to triple digits. Preventing a third was incredibly high on British Railways agenda, as well as that of the railway inspectorate. To work towards preventing this, part of the report included recommendations.

These recommendations have always been a part of these reports, and they still are, every RAIB report today has a recommendation section.

They could be a suggestion to retrain staff on a particular issue, or to redesign a process or a practice. They could be that the infrastructure operator needs to redevelop a system of work or revise maintenance regimes, you get the idea.

The strongest recommendation by far from the report into Harrow & Wealdstone actually revolved around a safety feature that could have prevented the accident. This technology? Automatic Train Control. As the report said; The way to guard against the exceptional case of human failure of the kind which occurred at Harrow does not lie in making the regulations more restrictive, with consequent adverse effect on traffic movement, but in reinforcing the vigilance of drivers by apparatus which provides a positive link between the wayside signals and the footplate.

We have this technology now, a system which reacts in this way and sends signals to the drivers based on what the signals say, AWS. The automatic warning system.

Back in October last year I released a bonus episode which covered AWS, going into the history a bit, feel free to go back and have a listen, but I’ll briefly run through some of it now.

The basic

The system works like this. Before each signal, there is a piece of equipment between the running rails in the space called the AWS ramp.

These AWS ramps consist of at least a few components. A sloped piece of metal, a permanent magnet which is constantly magnetised, and an electromagnet , which can be turned on and off.

The principle of the system is known as set/reset. As the train passes over the permanent magnet, the system is set. As the train continues it passes over the electromagnet, which resets the system.

This electromagnet is only energised if the attached signal is showing a proceed aspect to the driver, and when the system is reset in this way the AWS sounder in the cab will make the bell sound.

If the signal is showing a caution, or a danger aspect, the electromagnet will not be energised. This means that when the train passes over the permanent magnet, the system is set, but isn’t reset within the required time frame of one second. At this point a warning horn sounds in the cab, after which the driver has 2.75 seconds to press a button in the cab to acknowledge the alarm, and if they don’t, the trains brakes are automatically applied, in a full emergency setting and the train will be brought to a stand. This is the thing that is of real relevance in this episode. Had AWS been in existence at the time of this disaster, then when Jones blew through the distant at yellow he would have received a horn, warning him of the adverse aspect. This would have given him ample time to slow the express for the home signals.

What a shame that this system wasn’t available.

Except, if you’ve heard that bonus episode, you’ll know that it was.

It first appeared in the form of Automatic Train Control, installed by GWR and fitted along it’s routes in the south of the country. This earlier system was reliant on physical contact between track and train ,and not magnets and was found from as early as 1906. A physical ramp would make contact with a shoe underneath the locomotive at Distant signals fulfilling the same purpose as the magnets I’ve just mentioned.

This fact was not lost on the investigators, and virtually two whole pages of the report tell the story of the history of automatic train control, pointing out that the Great Western Railway had 1300 miles of route covered by the system. It also makes reference to trials with a system known as thr Hudd System, an adaptation of the system using magnets. Sound familiar?

The report detailed the progress being made on this technology “After some small scale comparative trials early in 1948, and discussions with the Inspecting Officers, the Railway Executive put forward tentative proposals for a programme to extend Warning Control on main line routes. They considered that it should be initiated as soon as circumstances would allow, and envisaged an expenditure of some £6 millions staged over six years.” Now credit where it’s due, this was no small proposed expenditure. This 6 million pounds is closer to 173 million today.

BR continued trials on the system, trying to perfect it over the next two years, and by August 1952 a final design had been put together, planned to be fitted to the first locomotive on the 17^th October.

9 days before this installation, A passenger express passed a signal at danger and led to the lives of 112 people.

<Musical Interlude>

Changes to the system going forwards

The tragedy at Harrow & Wealdstone led to a real surge in the implimentation of Automatic Train Control, and the new system, dubbed AWS, was finally approved by the ministry of transport in 1956. From that point installation increased and spread out further and further. Distant signals in absolute block areas were fitted with them, and when colour light signals were introduced they were fitted there too.

We know as an industry that AWS has gone a long way to saving lives, and there are many incidents that have become training opportunities, or near misses that could so easily have been, well, episodes for this podcast.

The idea was taken further in the 90s, with Train Protection and Warning System, TPWS, which can automatically apply the brakes based on the speed a train approaches buffer stops, signals, or even just operate as an overspeed sensor anywhere on the network.

Yes, in an ideal world it would be great to just trust that humans will never make errors, but sadly, we know that it’s simply not the case, mistakes happen, so it’s so important to have these safety nets, nobody wants to see another Harrow.

Musical interlude into credits?

Episode Conclusion – Memorial and poignancy please.

The sheer number of lives lost at Harrow is what makes this such a significant disaster. 112 people.

It’s difficult to imagine it isn’t it? I for one can say I never want to open a newspaper and read double figures from a train crash again. However I don’t know that we will always be that lucky.

Carmont took the lives of three last year, but in a world where passenger numbers were down around 90%. I dread to think what that number might have been in a normal year.

We can put all of the protections in place, the best rolling stock, but sometimes the forces involved can surmount all of that. If we were to duplicate the circumstances at Harrow with modern stock? I certainly don’t know that we would be lucky enough to come away with a single digit toll.

The terrible October morning in 1952 was commemorated with a memorial, the North entry to the station was adorned with a stone plaque, this was unveiled 50 years after the accident, in 2002, which really seems like some time, but it makes sense to remember it in this way. It was also commemorated as part of a mural adorning the wall alongside the station, dedicating it to the memories of those who lost lives, and in gratitude to those who saved them. These memorials allow for a moment of reflection for the millions of people who enter the station each year, starting a daily commute into the city, a normal, everyday journey, in exactly the same way as so many others did 70 years ago.

Thank you as for tuning into episode 17, Once again, please like, share and review, come interact with us on social media, twitter or facebook, just search for Signals To Danger or Daniel Fox Rail.

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Until next episode, Travel Safe!

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