Podcast Introduction

Hello again, and welcome back once again to Episode 21 of Signals to Danger.

An apology for the delay in releasing this episode is probably needed. My laptop, which I unsurprisingly rely on quite heavily, was subjected to a deluge of liquid a week or two back courtesy of my fiance. Not only was it liquid, it was lucozade so you can only imagine the sticky, syrupy panic I was trying to fight when she told me. 

After a week of leaving it to dry out, thankfully we realised it still works! The keys are a bit sticky, and writing this script has been more painful than usual, but it works, the podcast continues!

As I do every episode, I’ll open by thanking you for your downloads, shares and likes and your interaction on social media. If you want to join those conversations you’ll find the podcast at @signalstodanger and me at @danielfoxrail. 

Dont forget that you can find show notes, the shop and more at signalstodanger.com, as well as being able to find out how to support the podcast. There’s a link there for the Patreon. I would love to take the opportunity to thank Andrew, Joshua, Anthony and Hassan for signing up to the Patreon.

With the intro out of the way, let’s get straight into this weeks episode.

Prelude

<opening credits>

Episode Introduction

 This is Signals to Danger, A podcast where we look at major rail disasters which have occurred in the UK, explain what happened, how the investigation was carried out, and how each of these accidents shaped the industry going forwards.

I’m Dan, I work within the rail industry in my day to day life but today I’ll be the one taking you through this podcast.

We start every episode by briefly revisiting the events which were taking place at the time, and this episode is no different, so let’s have a look at 1951.

On January the first, a universally recognised theme tune first took to the airwaves, many many years later you can still hear it, I would whistle it, but theres probably a copyright issue. It was the archers, and the drama had begun.

March introduced us to Dennis the Menace, superstar of the beano to this day.

The year also sees the establishment of the national parks in the UK. April saw the peak distinct, May the lakes, and november saw dartmoor and snowdonia join them.

On the third of may the festival of britain was opened, showcasing the achievements of a proud nation.

In october, Churchill begins his second block of time serving as PM after 6 years of labour leadership, and the first zebra crossing appeared on our roads for the first time. The positives however were somewhat overshadowed by an increasing breakdown in british and egyptian relationships, which would culminate in the suez canal crisis several years later

All of this was very exciting, and mostly positive, especially considering some of these intros, but unfortunately we can’t remain in the positives, as our story takes us to the 16th of March.

<Musical interlude>

Doncaster and the ECML

Once more this episode brings us to the East Coast Main Line. And with 6 appearances on the record so far, that means that over a quarter of our episodes have taken place here so far. You could be forgiven for thinking that this makes the ECML a dangerous piece of railway real estate, but allow me to reassure you that it isn’t. It just so happens that if you wanted to pick any line, you’d probably find an equally bloody history, it just so happens that these are the episodes I’ve covered so far.

The line, stretching from Edinburgh Waverly down to London Kings Cross, is one of the major arterial routes up and down the country and carries both long distance passengers and local commuters as it currently stands. And in the past the scene wasn’t too different, but admittedly a little more smokey.

This line is a crucial link up and down the nation, and because of this towns and cities grew and grew in close proximity. Newcastle, York, Peterborough. All of them gained main line, large stations, sprawling goods yards and miles of sidings. Among them was another railway town, Doncaster.

Nowadays Doncaster, or Donny, if you will, because it seems we don’t like saying full names in Yorkshire, is a firm favourite with the rail enthusiast. With several platforms, bays and through platforms, there is quite the choice of place to stand and watch trains pass by. There’s no shortage of traction either, with high speed passenger stock almost as frequent as commuter and freight services. One of the main draws however stands between the main up and down platforms. Two through roads without platforms. A great opportunity to watch trains fly by at line speed without being too far away from a coffee shop.

In 1951 Doncaster was as much of a hive of activity as it is now, trains arriving and leaving all of the time as well as those speeding through. Todays story is that of a train which departed Doncaster on the 16th March, but the story actually began with two trains which arrived here.

<musical swell>

The Train and it’s journey

Last episode I talked about one of the benefits of coaches and locomotives when compared  to the multiple units of the present. Trains could be made up of exactly the types and numbers of carriages required, but additionally to that, trains could joined and split at different locations across the route. This is one aspect of operation which the multiple units can replicate now. While it’s great to run trains to every place from every place, it doesn’t really translate to the most efficient way of working. Say for example you wanted to run a train from Middlesbrough to London, and another from Scarborough to London. You can run two completely separate trains, but that means two sets of traincrew all the way down the country, a duplication of hours. That could be frustrating, but, if there are trains to run, then operators can always hire in more crew. 

There is a bigger constraint which forms much more of a hard limit. Paths. The very short version, and I promise I’m about to circle back to todays story, is this.

Because of the distance between signals there are a limited number of trains that can run on any given section of the network. There’s a theoretical maximum of one train per each signal section, however this would mean that every single train would constantly be approaching red signals, and crawling along, never getting up to speed. 

In an ideal world you’d always be around 4 sections apart and running on green signals, but the more congested the railway, the less feasible this is. Hence the concept of paths. 

For each section of line, there is a limited number of paths, which are more or less “slots” for trains to pass through, this controls the congestion in the area and allows the reduced number of trains to move more quickly. Very simple and effective but could scupper your plans to run trains from everywhere to everywhere, but there is a really simple way around this, and we see it relatively frequently nowadays. 

Going back to the example of our two, theoretical trains to London. There aren’t enough available paths for both trains to travel on the busy, congested lines towards London, so a different method of work is used. Two trains would start their own journeys, one in middlesbrough and one in Scarborough. They would both run in their own paths from their up until the point their routes converged, York. At this point the two units could be coupled together and run forward as one train. Only one path needed, and only one set of traincrew required. 

And this isn’t a modern concept, which is where we eventually circle back round to todays tale. 

This has been going on for almost as long as the railway has, and was easy enough to do when trains were composed of separate carriages. These could be shunted, added and subtracted at major stations on the route, and were, routinely. 

At 8 45 in the morning on the 16th March, a train left Hull, on Yorkshires East Coast and after a relatively short journey arrived at Doncaster. 6 vehicles of this train were now due to form part of another train, the 1006 train from Doncaster to London Kings Cross. 

These 6 carriages, a third class with a brake compartment, 3 corridor third class coaches and two composite carriages, with a mixture of accommodation, would provide plenty of seats, but not enough for an express to the capital. Shortly after the arrival of the train from Hull, a further 9 vehicles arrived on the 0915 train from York. 

Coupled up to the rear of the first 6 vehicles were a further 4 third class coaches, a third class restaurant car, a first class restaurant and carriage and a further third class carriage. The rear of the train was brought up with a horsebox, and at the lead end an appropriate engine was added to draw the express southbound. 

60501, cock o the north was 101 tonnes of metal, capable of drawing the weight of the 15 vehicles behind it at line speed, and had a competent, experienced driver at the controls. Driver Wadsworth had much experience of driving expresses along the east coast main line, and was stationed out of Doncaster shed. 

At 7 minutes past 10, 1 minute late, cock o the north drew out of platform 4 at Doncaster, and began the 170 mile journey south bound. Neither Wadsworth, nor the 250 passengers on board knew that the journey  would come to a sudden end less than 900 meters and around a minute later.

<Musical Interlude>

The Accident & Aftermath

The 1006 express to kings cross departed from Platform 4 at Doncaster. This was one of the main platforms used for up express trains, headed south to london. It’s not the main line however, do you remember when I was talking about the draw for trainspotters at the station? The two through roads. Those are the up main line and the down main line. The line through platform 4 is the up Slow line, and so expresses leaving the station, needed to cross over from the slow line to the main to make the best time southbound. 

There are two methods of doing this, the first is a departure from the platform directly to the main via a crossover immediately following the platform. The second involves the train remaining on the slow line for 500 metres, before traversing another crossover onto the main. It was this second route that Wadsworth was routed via. 

He gradually increased his speed, and approached the crossover to the main. cock o the north crossed over to the north comfortably, as did the first two carriages of the train. It was however at this point that things started to go awry. 

Either the trailing bogie of the third of the leading bogie of the fourth derailed to the left as it traversed the crossover. As the train continued onwards the wheels of the next 6 carriages followed suit, also derailing to the left. 

At such a low speed this could easily of been a minor occurrence, had it not been for the presence of another piece of trackwork. 22 yards further along the track there was a long crossover, this ran from the down slow, across all of the lines diagonally and to the goods lines on the other side. This crossover ran across the route, right to the left and played a crucial part in this incident. 

As the rear of the third coach met the crossover its derailed wheels were diverted to the left, along with the leading bogie of the fourth. This created a unique situation. cock o the north at the lead of the train continued to pull the train forwards, and the first two carriages and the front of the third followed it onto the up Main. The trailing end of the third continued to rotate to the left, increasingly broadside, and it must have been clear to those travelling within that something was very wrong, even at this low speed. We’re not supposed to travel sideways on a train. The carriage continued to move in this way due to the two forces acting independently on it. The leading end being pulled by the loco, and the trailing end propelled by the weight of the train behind it.

Once more in this accident, the placement of a feature significantly worsened the outcome. 100 yard beyond the start of the derailment standsBalby Bridge. South of the station this structure carried the junctions of 5 roads, including one of the main routes into central Doncaster. 

To hold up such a substantial structure, the bridge is supported by heavy brick abutments, and the placement of one of these is the reason this accident is the subject of an episode.

As the third coach of the train continued to run increasingly perpendicular to the tracks, the leading end was on the up main, and the rear on the up fast. Separating these tracks was a heavy bridge abutment, and when the carriage met it the unthinkable happened. 

Those two forces acted on it with disastrous consequences. cock o the north pulled the lead end around the bridge, and the force of 12 carriages behind it pushed the trailing end around on the opposite side. The body of the coach was crushed against the bridge and all but destroyed, and the underframe bent around the stone as if made of something far less substantial than the steel it was actually constructed from. 

The leading end of the fourth carriage was thrust into the opposite side of the channel through the bridge, causing further damage to both, and locking the third firmly in place. 

This is the first indication that Wadsworth and his fireman had that something was out of place, as the coupling between the second and third carriages was suddenly sheered. There was no way the third could by dragged back around, pinned in as it was by the fourth. When the coupling split, the air hoses connecting the braking systems separated and the train came to a stand 75 yards further on, the loco and first two carriages undamaged.

The rear of the sixth and the front of the seventh vehicles were carried over to the left until they came to rest nearly at right angles to the tracks, with the sixth coach tilted to the left and the seventh coach overturned on its side ; the panelling of both vehicles was damaged and their underframes were twisted, but this was nothing compared to the damage on the 3rd and fourth.

The next two vehicles and the leading bogie of the tenth coach were derailed without much damage and the rest of the train remained on the line.

A low speed derailment, a minute outside of a mainline station and only involving one train should not have been overly concerning. This should have been an inconvenience, but instead it was a disaster. 

Every ambulance in Doncaster was summoned and firemen, doctors and people from nearby houses worked feverishly to aid the injured and search for victims, and they did find victims. 

18 of the trains passengers were transported to hospital, and all but 6 were detained there due to the severity of their injuries. The sheer level of destruction caused to the third coach however almost guaranteed that injuries were not going to be the worst of this disaster. 14 occupants of this coach were entered into the records as the lives lost. 14 people who would not make it to work, or return home to loved ones. Three of this number felt a whole other level of sadness, as the list included a loving husband, his devoted wife… and tragically their 12 month old child. 

 <Musical Interlude sad/dramatic – Reprise?>

Introduction to the Investigation

Once the passengers had been evacuated and the injured rescued, the process of recovery began. The accident had blocked all but two of the lines South of Doncaster, and those were needed for the recovery work. Breakdown cranes from Doncaster, peterborough and York were called to the scene to aid with the recovery. 

The main lines were successfully released back to traffic by 1115 in the evening, around 13 hours worth of downtime, but the goods lines were out for another few days. 

The inspectorate was on the scene as soon as possible, and at the head of the team were leftenant colonel GRS Wilson and Brigadier CA Langley. These are names we’ve come across before, and the professionals were well and truly on the case.

Their task was quite clear, they needed to understand the reason that a journey lasting around a minute had resulted in the deaths of 14 people and the destruction of a carriage beyond all recognition. And they would do this through answering several key questions.

Most importantly, what was the initial cause of the derailment, what had led to the wheels leaving the track.

Once that was ascertained, had there been any contributing factors? Speed, poor design, that sort of thing.

 <Musical Interlude>

How did the train derail?

We’ve had a few derailment episodes recently, so I’m not going to bore you by going straight back to my regular derailment mantra! I’ll give you a week off. And in all honesty, with such a short journey travelled, it was not a particular tasking experience to isolate the point where the physical derailment took place.

The track was examined about four hours after the derailment when some of the coaches had been rerailed and moved clear of the crossover. What they found was a close group of diagonal marks about 7 feet long running across the head of the left hand rail from the inside to the outside, beginning at the trailing end of the check rail in the crossover between the up slow and the up fast. These marks could only have been made by a number of wheel flanges passing over the top of the rail, and there were corresponding flange marks on the chairs and sleepers beyond it. This type of scarring is sometimes referred to as witness marks, and they can tell the story of what took place. They clearly identified that the derailment took place at the crossover. 

And it’s true that we could probably have arrived at this conclusion without a great deal of guesswork. We’ve seen time and time again on this podcast that switches and crossings can be a place where there’s an inherit weakness in the system. It’s not to say that they’re dangerous, it’s just that the moving parts, and gaps in the rail have risks that a solid piece of metal doesn’t. We saw this in the episodes at Potters Bar, Grayrigg, Ealing and Conington to name just a few. So it isn’t surprising that investigators looked at the crossing that the express was traversing at the time the derailment took place.

In the throat of the crossover itself, bolts were found broken and missing which were integral to keeping the tracks in gauge to each other, and distance blocks, pieces of metal which should have helped this happen, were found to be displaced as well. Beyond the throat there were marks of severe rubbing on the inside vertical face of the rail head, and it appeared from these and other marks that a number of wheels had dropped between the two wing rails at or about the throat.

It was clear that the train had derailed as part of the process of crossing over from the Up Slow to the Up Fast. Part one answered. But now the team needed to understand the underlying reasons, and of course it wouldn’t be quite as simple to answer.

<Musical Interlude>

Now we know how, let’s talk about why

Of course it would not do for us simply to say that and move on, it would also massively shorten the episode.

To start unpicking the reasons a derailment might have taken place at the crossover, we can start by looking at the crossover itself. Was there physically anything in the design of the layout which might have contributed to the disaster.

There was, in fact, something unconventional in the design of the crossover itself. I said earlier that there was two methods by which a train could leave platform 4 and head south on to the Up main. This wasn’t always the case however. Up until 1910, all trains took the crossover immediately following the platform. In 1910 however a siding was converted into a running line, bringing the up slow into play. This added additional flexibility to the operation of the station, allowing a train to depart platform 4 and free it up for another departure if a train was approaching on the main. However, the other track, junctions and pieces of infrastructure put real constraints on where the crossover to the up main could be placed.

The location of the crossover had to be at a point where the lines were on a curve, approaching Balby Bridge. This in itself was not a problem, but because the main lines were used for non stop expresses, the line featured another characteristic we’ve discussed before. Superelevation, or cant. 

To aid the trains rocketing through the corner at 60 miles an hour in cornering the outside rail was inclined, 4 inches higher than the inside one, banking the train in to the corner. Unfortunately this could not be replicated on the down slow, as trains traveling on the slower line might be unbalanced by the angle. 

Because of this, the tracks of the crossover needed to move from virtually level, to a steep angle of cant in a relatively short space of time. Under 40 feet to have one side tipped up by four inches. 

For a train travelling at a good clip, this could be a very unsettling set of forces, a swift rock to one side which is probably best avoided. So, how could such a layout exist? With a risk control in place of course! You’ve listened before!

A speed limit was imposed on the down slow between platform 4, all the way to the point where the line joined the up main. 10 miles an hour. This heavily reduced speed should have mitigated the risk of the cant, or at least severely minimised it. 

So our next question must be, had the 1006 been travelling at the limit when the train passed over this track?

Wadsworth was asked about his speed, of course he was. We’re ahead of the era of widespread on-train data recorders, so we have to use other methods. Personal accounts are a big part of that. 

Wadsworth reckoned that he’d been travelling at around 15 miles an hour at the point he took cock o the north between the slow and main lines, but he also told investigators that he might have travelled over it at 20 to 25 miles an hour previously. He knew that the limit was 10, but we need to take two additional factors into consideration. 

Firstly, driving a steam locomotive is not always an exact science. While I have no doubt in the ability of any driver, but controls are far more complex than the small handles and levers of the present, all within an arm’s reach and all instantly reactive to inputs. So this means that in realism there may not always be so much precision. But, this pales in significance to the second factor. 

Cock O the north did not have a speedometer. In fact, most locomotives at this time did not have them. Most drivers obeyed speed limits through a learned judgement, surprisingly accurate in all fairness, but obviously open to misunderstanding. So yes, Wadsworth believed he had been travelling at 15miles an hour, but even the investigators acknowledged that these lower speeds might be difficult to estimate from the footplate of a large express locomotive. 

It was necessary to gain a more empirical grasp of the speed the train had been travelling on the day of the accident, so a series of test runs were undertaken. 

Cock o the north was lashed up to a train, composed as closely as possible to the accident train. Three runs were made, and on each occasion the train started from No. 4 platform and was run to the south. Instead of travelling along the Up Slow line, the train was turned on to the Up Main at the platform crossover so as to avoid any risk of excessive speed through the scissors crossover. The trials were witnessed by Signalman Cutforth in Doncaster South box, and by Signalman Cooper in Bridge Junction box, both of whom were on duty at the time of the accident.

The first run resulted in a theoretical speed of 17 miles an hour over the crossover, the second 23 miles an hour and the third 25. 

The thoughts of the signallers? The second and third runs, 23 and 25 miles an hour was most accurate. Not exactly 10 miles an hour. 

So, was this our smoking gun?

You could be forgiven for thinking so, however when the points were inspected, other issues were found with them, not directly related to the derailment which raised larger questions to the maintenance of the crossover itself.

The sleepers were found to pump as trains passed over it, the sleepers dipped as the weight of trains pushed down on them. This is not meant to happen, and it’s indicative of voids forming in the ballast below the track. Not a good thing, and something that should be rectified. In a similar vein, one of the packing pieces from under a rail chair, again something that needed to be resolved. 

The track was inspected daily, but on the morning in question, this had not taken place yet, but on the previous day, none of the damaged or missing bolts were accounted for.

After every factor was considered, it was decided that one of the factors could be handed the main blame for the derailment.

Although there was no clear proof how the damage to the crossing at Doncaster had been

initiated, the throat bolt and the A chair bolt were weakened by fatigue flaws to such an extent that they might have broken under traffic at any time. The crossing had not been inspected on the morning of the accident and it seems at least possible that a key might have been loose or might have fallen out under the vibration of traffic; this is by no means unknown, and during inspections after the accident the investigators witnessed how easily it could happen. If this key had been out and the bolts broken by the passage of the engine

of the derailed train or of one before it on the Main or Slow line, the lateral support of the other rails would have been seriously weakened. A dangerous state of play indeed.

Other bolts had been found during the examination that were in such a poor condition that they could have broken under traffic at any time. The track here, though it appeared to have survived the accident relatively well, clearly showed some significant signs of poor repair. The investigators noted that the checking faces of both wing rails had been worn back considerably. This meant that if an axle had run as far left as this wear would now allow, the support of the right-hand wheel would be “barely continuous” crossing from the point rail to the wing rail. If that happened then it would be possible for the heavy weight of a locomotive or tender to deliver a heavy blow to the wing rail, breaking the already fatigued bolts.

The report of the accident concluded that the wheels of a locomotive or tender, rigidly held in place, would have the potential to cross through this sort of damage, but that a bogie would oscillate and continue to strike the rails with increasing force. This would widen the gauge of the rails progressively up until such a point that the oscillation would become so severe that once wheel would rebound with enough force that the opposite wheel would be forced over the rail.

Although the steep cant gradient and sharp curvature could, in the inspectorates opinion, have given rise to dangerous conditions at speeds of 25 m.p.h., they couldn’t reconcile the damage to the right hand crossing with an initial derailment to the Left, because we cannot see how the force required to break the crossing behind the point of derailment could have  been applied by bogies as they were derailed in the opposite direction. The forces released when a train leaves the rails are, however, very high and the behaviour of bogies during a derailment is unpredictable. 

They wrote however that after the trailing wheels of the third coach had been derailed to the left, one or other of the following bogies was twisted to such an extent that it burst open the right hand crossing, allowing the following right band wheels to drop down and force the left hand wheels over the opposite rail. 

Their theory however was that the evidence points more strongly to the failure of the right hand wing rail having been the cause and not the effect of the derailment. The other witness markings and the wreckage supported this.

Because of this, the record will forever show that the disaster was initiated by the bursting of the crossing. The speed of the train was considerably higher than the maximum permitted, but in normal circumstances, no serious consequences would be expected from a derailment at 25 m.p.h. 

The unfortunate placement of the Barlby Bridge abutment was the factor which turned this into tragedy. 

 <Musical Interlude>

Episode Conclusion – Memorial and poignancy please.

Our smoking gun was finally located, the report apprased the minister of how those responsible for the crossing were not paying sufficient attention to the maintenance of the scissors crossover, particularly as there were pumping sleepers and a worn-out packing piece in addition to the missing bolt in the right hand crossing and the loose bolt opposite to it. They were aware of the 10 m.p.h. restriction but it is clear that they did not appreciate the standard of maintenance required for the heavy passenger traffic.

The point was raised that some of the failed components, the bolts specifically, could develop cracks that weren’t visible from an external inspection. And noted that once those cracks had developed, they could feasibly break at any time.  The solution to this was to work towards scientifically identifying the behaviour of crossing bolts in service to ascertain whether they should be renewed periodically depending on the character and weight of the traffic over them, or whether, given good maintenance in other respects, they can safely be left in position until the crossing is due for renewal. This is the start of a concept of empirically proven asset lives and scheduled replacement.

Although the investigation had laid the blame for the accident at a poorly maintained crossing bursting, it did not deny that other factors had contributed. 

Speed for example, Yes, Wadsworth had been speeding over the crossover, and had the accident taken place at 10 miles an hour, it may not have been so severe. But this is entering the world of ifs and buts, and nobody really knows. The accident may have continued on in much the same way but slower. Maybe the crossover would not have burst at all, but considering its condition, this was probably a case of when and not if. 

 Not much blame was laid at the feet of the driver though, as I said earlier on, Driver Wadsworth was at fault for failing to comply with the restriction, but his engine was not fitted with a speed indicator and speeds of 20 to 25 m.p.h. may seem deceptively slow on the footplate of a large express engine, especially if it is in good condition, as in this instance. We’re all a good estimate of driving along at 30 or 70, because we spend a massive part of our time in the car at those speeds. I would challenge you to estimate a drive along your road at 10mph exactly, I think that is harder to do without the speedo. Transport yourself a few feet into the air and then try to concentrate of 10 other dials and gizmos… I think you get the image. 

There was an institutional issue with the speeding as well though. After the accident the engineering department conducted some assessments of trains passing to the main by this route, a great deal of them did so at about 20 miles an hour. It transpired that this was known to be taking place, and nobody had ever made any effort to bring the practice to a close. 

They also found that there was an adverse effect to an attempt to operate safely. The whole route of the up slow, the long relatively straight approach and the crossover was restricted to 10 mph. This actually had the adverse effect of reducing focus on the actual need for the restriction, the crossover. Following the accident a speed restriction board was erected much closer to remind them. 

Steep cant gradients are unavoidable in some places but the report recommended that they  should, wherever possible, be eliminated and suggested that any layouts with similar features should be investigated to see whether they could be remodelled at a future date. The arrangement at Doncaster was examined, and a scheme was prepared in which the scissors was replaced by a simple crossover, one with flatter crossings and improved cant gradient. This led to speeds of 20 m.p.h, and a safer overall transition between lines.

Sometimes when I make these episodes, the recommendations are something we have unpicked and uncovered from under layers of carefully unpicked issues… and sometimes they are so obvious they might as well be a slap in the face. Today, our last recommendation is a slap.

To read it from the report itself..

It is inevitable that there should be a number of places on every railway line where there are very definite limits of safe speed, and for such places suitable speed limits are prescribed by the Engineer.

 In contrast with accepted practice elsewhere, few locomotives in this country are equipped with speed indicators, and reliance is placed on the engine driver to judge his speed with sufficient accuracy in the observance of the prescribed restrictions.

There is no question that speed indicators would enable drivers to ohey restrictions more accurately than they can do at present, and we have no doubt that they would be welcomed by the civil engineers and the footplate staff alike. We therefore recommend that they should form part of the equipment of the new standard locomotives, and that in due time all engines likely to be used on important passenger services should be similarly equipped.

Yes. The final recommendation of the Doncaster report was to install speedometers on trains. To me it seems akin to recommending to a person boiling the kettle that they need to put water in it, or the person cooking their tea that the oven needs turning on. The technology existed, the industry had simply not embraced it on widespread basis. As technologically advanced as the UK industry has always been, this seems like a glaring gap in the system. It’s difficult to reconcile, but at least the process began at this point to rectify the issue.

Photographs of a passenger carriage wrapped around a bridge abutment is without a doubt one of the more striking images I have seen while producing this podcast, and it’s difficult to imagine the fear and horror that those inside must have experienced. Less than a minute after leaving the station, some of those on board will still have been settling in to their seats, preparing for the journey south. 

A day can change so completely in less than 60 seconds, maybe it’s something we should all consider next time we start our journeys, maybe we should spare a thought for those who never reach the destination.

<CREDITS>

Thank you as for tuning into episode 20, Once again, please like, share and review, come interact with us on social media, twitter or facebook, just search for Signals To Danger or Daniel Fox Rail.

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Until next episode, Travel Safe!

https://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/whats-on/arts-and-entertainment/nostalgia-tuesday-double-disaster-1774108

https://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/documents/MoT_Doncaster1951.pdf

https://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/eventsummary.php?eventID=366

on the way!